Has the EU reached the limits of integration? h2>
COURSE
ESSAY "Political Aspects of European Integration" p>
By
Yaroslav Sinitsov, EUBL p>
University
of Amsterdam p>
Introduction h2>
Before answering this question, let us face some obvious
facts. So far, the European Union has been the most advanced and successful
alliances of the independent countries in the modern history. One cannot deny
that it is only the EU which established - at least in the first pillar - a new
legal order for its Member States, by which they voluntarily shared their
sovereignty based on the rule of law in order to achieve the common task, as
set forth by Article 2 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community:
'... to promote throughout the Community a harmonious and balanced development
of economic activities, sustainable and non-inflationary growth respecting the
environment, a high degree of convergence of economic performance, a high level
of employment and of social protection, the raising of a standard of living and
quality of life, and economic and social cohesion and solidarity among Member
States. '[I]
But as with any other international treaty, there is always room for diversity
in interpretation. If the right to interpret the Treaty provisions and other
Community legislation had been vested in Member States, the EU would have been
nothing different but just another international treaty nicely falling within
the general system of public international law, where no contracting party can
be bound against its will. The EU is unique to have the European Court of
Justice which, unlike any other international tribunals, has a compulsory
jurisdiction and an exclusive authority to interpret the Community legislation
- At least, with respect to the first pillar of the EU. By widely interpreting
the EC legislation and relying not just on the text, but also on 'the spirit'
of the Treaty, the European Court of Justice has actually developed its own
doctrine which is now seen as one of the important sources of the Community
law. This doctrine has played a crucial role in implementing EU policies, since
the text of the Treaty and other Community legislation cannot cover in detail
all aspects of integration. Despite the instability of its development, the EU
remains by far more efficient that any other possible alternatives. The EU is a
major achievement and is still on the move. IGCs being clearly inter-state
negotiations bear little resemblance to classical diplomatic conferences
reviewing international treaties. European Treaty reform 'is perhaps better
looked at as the constitutional process - with an integral role being played by
the representatives of the people, both at national and European level. '[ii]
p>
Why Integrate? p>
But why integrate? What made European governments act
against their cautious political interests? The answer was given by Jean
Monnet, one of the founding fathers of the European Communities and a lover of
aphorisms: 'People only accept changes when faced with necessity, and only
recognise necessity when the crisis is upon them '[iii]
. I
couldn't agree more with the first part of Monnet's saying, but I would like to
replace the word 'only' with the word 'better' in its second part. A deep
crisis is probably the most powerful impetus to bring peoples and countries
together, although not the only one. This is exactly what happened immediately
after the World WarII. The need for fundamental political and economic change
in Europe was extremely strong. As the Cold War commenced and the Iron Curtain
abruptly divided the continent, integration became a means by which the Western
Europe could defend itself, in close co-operation with the United States,
against the external Soviet threat and the internal communist threat. The need
for a stronger and united Europe outweighed an initial desire of the Allies to
pasteurise Germany. A stronger Europe must have a strong Western Germany. At
that time the Europe was on the move to integrate. And it has been on the move
to integrate since then. However, the dialectics of the integration has
dramatically changed with the change of the world affairs in the years
1989-1992. The old dialectics was that of the Cold War, with the familiar and
multiple interactions between the two Europes, the two alliances and the two
great powers. The new dialectics is of a pan-European solidarity and
all-European integration, and it has never been tried before. p>
Multi-Speed Integration h2>
Naturally, in some areas governments tend to reach
agreements more easily. 'The least disputed goal of European Construction is
the large market without borders; even those Member States with reservations
over other objectives do not dispute this one '. [iv]
This
explains why the first pillar of the EU - economic integration - has virtually
reached supranational level. Community member states are willing to share their
sovereignty in this field because it is clearly in their interest to do so. The
European Single Market has become the world's largest domestic market. It has
contributed significantly to the economic growth, though its full potential has
not yet been realised. But '... the political will is evident. This needs to be
translated into targeted action. '[v]
p>
By contrast, quite little has been achieved since
Maastricht in the two other pillars of the EU - Common and Foreign Security
Policy (CFSP) and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) which still remain
intergovernmental. This has become a reality in the integration process: the
integration speeds in the first pillar as compared to the other two pillars
vary dramatically. 'Economic integration and security co-operation have always
been a couple dancing apart from each other on the same dance floor. Despite
its recurrent crises and setbacks, the process of economic integration has
tended to follow the neo-functionalist logic of the expansiveness and sectoral
integration ... European security co-operation has always lagged behind in this
respect. '[vi]
p>
By common agreement, CFSP was one of the major
disappointments of Maastricht. After all, Maastricht proposed not only a common
foreign and security policy, but declared the eventual aim to be a common defence.
This has inevitably lead to the relationship between the EU and the defence
alliance, the Western European Union (WEU), being put at stake. This has become
even more challenging since the founding treaty of the WEU expires in 1998.
However, the EU does not seem to be willing to take control in this area, as it
is felt that the EU is being backed up by its major defence partner - the
United States. The US has always been able to act (and this is what happened
when the war in former Yugoslavia broke out) as a 'saviour of Europe' in
defence and peace-keeping matters. p>
Similarly, JHA pillar which includes issues of combating
international crime and fraud, and issues related to a common approach to
immigration policy is a hard nut to crack for the EU because of the national
sensitivity to these. However, there has been some progress in this respect in
Maastricht and further in Amsterdam - at least the workable mechanism was set
out. Besides, it is a very fertile area of co-operation between the EU and the
US. P>
On the whole, the EU since Maastricht has failed to live
up to the peoples 'expectations. The existing structures are further challenged
by the prospects of further integration eastwards: a number of countries in
Central and Eastern Europe, plus some of the successor states of the Soviet
Union are striving to modernise economically and politically, and the EU is an
important magnet for them, whether as a market, a political system seeking to
uphold democratic norms and values, or a putative defence system. The queue for
membership has lengthened. But the Union is not as attractive from the inside
as it may look from the outside. It seemed that the 'Monnet-method', i.e. a
closer interaction of national elites as a means for European integration has
reached its limits. Indeed, the EU has experienced serious internal problems in
the aftermath of Maastricht. One of the most obvious was the ratification
crisis. In the narrow sense it meant a 'petit oui' vote in French referendum
for the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty and the initial 'no' vote in
Danish referendum. In a wider sense it meant a lack of political support of the
EU, widening of the gap between the governments and the governed, and the lack
of leadership in the EU. As the involvement of the EU and its institutions has
expanded, but without any complementary shift in the sense of involvement and
identification of the electorate, the questions rose about its very legitimacy. p>
Limits of European Integration? p>
Legitimacy and Democracy p>
'The EU as a scapegoat is hardly a new concept; the
problem lies in the fact that the EU has moved into an ever-wider range of
policy areas, including, with Maastricht, areas previously very closely
identified with the prerogative of the nation state '[vii]
.
The traditional concept of legitimacy cannot be fully applied to the
institutions of the EU simply because a 'single European nation', or European
demos in its traditional sense does not exist as such and is not likely to
appear within foreseeable future. 'The integration is not about creating a
European nation or people, but about the ever closer Union among the peoples of
Europe '[viii]
.
A parliament is a traditionally democratic institution not because 'it provides
a mechanism for representation and majority voting, but because it represents
... the nation, the demos from which it derives its authority and legitimacy of
its decisions '[ix]
.
If we follow the logic of this no-demos clause, the European Parliament cannot
be legitimate and democratic by definition, and, therefore, the increase of
powers of the EP at the expense of the Council (the voice of the Member States)
is a step in the wrong direction. I cannot agree to this. The demos is
traditionally seen though the ethno-cultural prism. Can't we imagine a 'polity
whose demos is defined, accepted and understood in civic, non-ethno-cultural
terms, and would have legitimate rule-making democratic authority an that
basis '[x]
?
Can't we separate nationality from citizenship? Can't people unite on the basis
of shared values, a shared understanding of rights and duties, and shared
rational, intellectual culture which transcends ethno-national differences?
This appears to be the concept of introducing EU citizenship. According to this
viewpoint (which is I personally share, too), the directly elected European
Parliament is a democratic and legitimate institution for EU citizens, and
therefore its powers must be increased. But the problem lies in
misunderstanding. During the Danish referendum for the ratification of
Maastricht, some Danes feared that when acquiring EU citizenship they were
losing their national citizenship. Indeed, '... there was a failure to put
across the idea that citizenship of the Union is not intended to replace the
national citizenship but actually to complement it '[xi]
.
In some cases the perception was the opposite. Thus, the European Union should
be brought closer to its citizens which will allow the disputes on legitimacy
to be resolved in future. To do this, the following issues must be addressed. P>
Transparency of the legislative process h2>
Over twenty separate complex systems are now used to
adopt legislation in the EU, and there is a lack of logic in the choice of the
various procedures. 'Although willing to share sovereignty, governments retain
as much political control as possible. '[xii]
Hence the complexity of institutional structure and number of decision-making
procedures which sometimes 'render the Union's modus operandi extremely
obscure '[xiii]
.
Simplification is, therefore, considered necessary and the pressure is growing
to reduce these procedures to three. The tendency is to move from unanimity to
qualified majority voting in the Council of Ministers, and to extending
co-decision powers of the European Parliament which, in turn, will increase the
legitimacy of the latter. Maintaining unanimity requirement could, indeed,
paralyse a larger Union and prevent future Treaty reform. p>
Flexibility h2>
Should Member States willing to do so be specifically
allowed to integrate their policies further and faster than their more
reluctant EU partners? Yes, otherwise the Union should be forever bound to
advance at the speed of its slowest members. To some extent, flexibility
already exists. Social policy, a single currency arrangement and the Schengen
acquis all involve fewer than all fifteen Member States. Moreover, unbalanced
economic integration of the EU has been beneficial to its Member States. As
long as there is agreement on the goal, we can have flexibility. If there is no
common goal we get variable geometry which is widely seen as more dangerous.
Flexibility supposes that more slower members will catch up while variable
geometry doesn't. p>
Efficiency h2>
Given its enormous significance, the EU is expected to
act efficiently. However, relatively small issues may suddenly become big
issues in practice. This is illustrated, for example, by the tendency to keep
the diversity of the official and working languages of the EU. 'The EU Council
of Ministers of 12 June 1995 has not only reaffirmed its firm attachment to
Linguistic Diversity, it has also decided to set up a commission to check that
all the Institutions respect this ... The Commission has been invited to make
yearly reports on the application of these decisions ...'[ xiv]
The current number of working languages of the EU is eleven. Since EU
legislation is directly applicable in the national law, all languages with the
official status in one or more of the Member States should be official EU
languages as well. This means that there are now eleven official EU languages.
With some Eastern Bloc countries joining the number will increase to sixteen or
more which, in my opinion, will be virtually unworkable. This will only
contribute to the lack of efficiency of the EU. I think it is wise to limit the
number of working languages to a minimum of five, although in view of the fact
that Council members have never been able to agree on a limit the number of
working languages within the institutions, one may expect a continuing debate
on this matter. p>
Conclusion h2>
As we see, the EU is far from being perfect. And it never
will, like any other man-made enterprise. But the Union cannot afford to be
politically disappointing to its Member States, and especially to the countries
which would like to join it. One could always argue that the EU will not
benefit from 'the fifth enlargement' neither politically, nor economically, nor
even administratively (since their ability to participate in the management of
the EU is doubtful), and that a wider Union means a weaker Union. It is true,
but, however, only in the short-run. The EU must upgrade its capacity to
respond favourably to the other counties in Europe, otherwise we may find
ourselves once again in a divided Europe. Therefore, my suggestion is that the
limits of integration of the EU are politically unaffordable, in other words,
'the locomotive of European Integration' has passed the point of no return and
there is no way back. There may be conflicting economic views about the wisdom
of European Integration, or a continuing debate over the preservation by
certain states of an ideal of national sovereignty, a tension between market
Europe and social Europe, but yet despite of all this '... there appears to be
an overall commitment to the process of integration in Europe for a variety of
reasons, backed up perhaps by the 'shadow of war' factor which served as the
original stimulus, so that whatever the tensions and differences which exist,
the 'journey to an unknown destination' continues. '[xv]
p>
[i]
Nigel Foster. 'EC Legislation' (Blackstone, 1997), 2 p>
[ii]
Geoffrey Edwards, Alfred Pijpers. 'The Politics of the European
Treaty Reform. The 1996 Intergovernmental Conference and Beyond '(Pinter,
1997), 8 p>
[iii]
Desmond Dinan. 'Ever Closer Union? An Introduction to the European
Community '(Macmillan, 1994), 14 p>
[iv]
'The new "1999 Objective" for the large market without borders
submitted by the European Commission to the Amsterdam Summit '(Bulletin
Quotidien Europe No 2039/2040, 12 June 1997), 1 p>
[v]
ibid., 1 p>
[vi]
Geoffrey Edwards, Alfred Pijpers.
'The Politics of the European Treaty Reform. The 1996 Intergovernmental
Conference and Beyond '(Pinter, 1997), 344 p>
[vii]
ibid, 342 p>
[viii]
Geoffrey Edwards, Alfred Pijpers.
'The Politics of the European Treaty Reform. The 1996 Intergovernmental
Conference and Beyond '(Pinter, 1997), 257 p>
[ix]
ibid. p>
[x]
Ibid, 261 p>
[xi]
Reflection Group 1995; 17 (Ibid,
62) p>
[xii]
Desmond Dinan. 'Ever Closer Union? An Introduction to the European
Community '(Macmillan, 1994), 3 p>
[xiii]
European Commission 1995:18. Quoted in Geoffrey Edwards, Alfred
Pijpers. 'The Politics of the European Treaty Reform. The 1996
Intergovernmental Conference and Beyond '(Pinter, 1997), 63 p>
[xiv]
'EU. Frequently Asked Questions 'Edited by Ronald Siebelink &
Bart Schelfhout p>
[xv]
Paul Craig, Grainne de Burca. 'EC Law. Texts, Cases &
Materials '(Clarendon Press - Oxford, 1997), 37 p>