Ministry of education, science and culture
High College of English
Graduation Paper
on theme:
US - Soviet relations.
Student: Pavlunina IV
Supervisor: Kolpakov A. V.
Bishkek 2000
Contents.
Introduction. 3
Chapter 1: The Historical Background of Cold War. 5
1.1 The Historical Context. 5
1.2 Causes and Interpretations. 10
Chapter 2: The Cold War Chronology. 17
2.1 The War Years. 17
2.2 The Truman Doctrine. 25
2.3 The Marshall Plan. 34
Chapter 3: The Role of Cold War in American History and Diplomacy. 37
3.1 Declaration of the Cold War. 37
3.2 Сold War Issues. 40
Conclusion. 49
Glossary. 50
The reference list.
51
Introduction.
This graduation paper is about US - Soviet relations in Cold Warperiod. Our purpose is to find out the causes of this war, positions of thecountries which took part in it. We also will discuss the main Cold War'sevents.
The Cold War was characterized by mutual distrust, suspicion andmisunderstanding by both the United States and Soviet Union, and theirallies. At times, these conditions increased the likelihood of the thirdworld war. The United States accused the USSR of seeking to expand
Communism throughout the world. The Soviets, meanwhile, charged the United
States with practicing imperialism and with attempting to stoprevolutionary activity in other countries. Each block's vision of the worldcontributed to East-West tension. The United States wanted a world ofindependent nations based on democratic principles. The Soviet Union,however, tried control areas it considered vital to its national interest,including much of Eastern Europe.
Through the Cold War did not begin until the end of World War II, in
1945, US-Soviet relations had been strained since 1917. In that year, arevolution in Russia established a Communist dictatorship there. During the
1920's and 1930's, the Soviets called for world revolution and thedestruction of capitalism, the economic system of United States. The United
States did not grant diplomatic recognition to the Soviet Union until 1933.
In 1941, during World War II, Germany attacked the Soviet Union. The
Soviet Union then joined the Western Allies in fighting Germany. For a timeearly in 1945, it seemed possible that a lasting friendship might developbetween the United States and Soviet Union based on their wartimecooperation. However, major differences continued to exist between the two,particularly with regard to Eastern Europe. As a result of thesedifferences, the United States adopted a "get tough" policy toward the
Soviet Union after the war ended. The Soviets responded by accusing the
United States and the other capitalist allies of the West of seeking toencircle the Soviet Union so they could eventually overthrow its Communistform of government.
The subject of Cold War interests American historicans and journalistsas well as Russian ones. In particular, famous journalist Henryh Borovikfraces this topic in his book. He analyzes the events of Cold War from thepoint of view of modern Russian man. With appearing of democracy andfreedom of speech we could free ourselves from past stereotype inperception of Cold War's events as well as America as a whole, we alsolearnt something new about American people's real life and personality. Anew developing stage of relations with the United States has begun with thecollapse of the Soviet Union on independent states. And in order to directthese relations in the right way it is necessary to study events of Cold
War very carefully and try to avoid past mistakes. Therefore this subjectis so much popular in our days.
This graduation paper consist of three chapters. The first chaptermaintain the historical documents which comment the origins of the Cold
War.
The second chapter maintain information about the most popular Cold
War's events.
The third chapter analyze the role of Cold War in World policy anddiplomacy. The chapter also adduce the Cold War issues.
Chapter 1: The Historical Background of Cold War.
1.1 The Historical Context.
The animosity of postwar Soviet-American relations drew on a deepreservoir of mutual distrust. Soviet suspicion of the United States wentback to America's hostile reaction to the Bolshevik revolution itself. Atthe end of World War I, President Woodrow Wilson had sent more than tenthousand American soldiers as part of an expeditionary allied force tooverthrow the new Soviet regime by force. When that venture failed, the
United States nevertheless withheld its recognition of the Sovietgovernment. Back in the United States, meanwhile, the fear of Marxistradicalism reached an hysterical pitch with the Red Scare of 1919-20.
Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer ordered government agents to arrest
3,000 purported members of the Communist party, and then attempted todeport them. American attitudes toward the seemed encapsulated in thecomments of one minister who called for the removal of communists in "shipsof stone with sails of lead, with the wrath of God for a breeze and withhell for their first port. "
American attitudes toward the Soviet Union, in turn, reflected profoundconcern about Soviet violation of human rights, democratic procedures, andinternational rules of civility. With brutal force, Soviet leaders hadimposed from above a revolution of agricultural collectivization andindustrialization. Millions had died as a consequence of forced removalfrom their lands. Anyone who protested was killed or sent to one of thehundreds of prison camps which, in Alexander Solzhenitsyn's words,stretched across the Soviet Union like a giant archipelago. What kind ofpeople were these, one relative of a prisoner asked, "who first decreed andthen carried out this mass destruction of their own kind? "Furthermore,
Soviet foreign policy seemed committed to the spread of revolution to othercountries, with international coordination of subversive activities placedin the hands of the Comintern. It was difficult to imagine two moredifferent societies.
For a brief period after the United States granted diplomaticrecognition to the Soviet Union in 1933, a new spirit of cooperationprevailed. But by the end of the 1930s suspicion and alienation had onceagain become dominant. From a Soviet perspective, the United States seemedunwilling to join collectively to oppose the Japanese and German menace. Ontwo occasions, the United States had refused to act in concert against Nazi
Germany. When Britain and France agreed at Munich to appease Adolph Hitler,the Soviets gave up on any possibility of allied action against Germany andtalked of a capitalist effort to encircle and destroy the Soviet regime.
Yet from a Western perspective, there seemed little basis fordistinguishing between Soviet tyranny and Nazi totalitarianism. Between
1936 and 1938 Stalin engaged in his own holocaust, sending up to 6 million
Soviet citizens to their deaths in massive purge trials. Stalin "sawenemies everywhere, "his daughter later recalled, and with a vengeancefrightening in its irrationality, sought to destroy them. It was an "orgyof terror, "one historian said. Diplomats saw high officials tapped on theshoulder in public places, removed from circulation, and then executed.
Foreigners were subject to constant surveillance. It was as if, George
Kennan noted, outsiders were representatives of "the devil, evil anddangerous, and to be shunned. "
On the basis of such experience, many Westerners concluded that Hitlerand Stalin were two of a kind, each reflecting a blood-thirsty obsessionwith power no matter what the cost to human decency. "Nations, likeindividuals, "Kennan said in 1938," are largely the products of theirenvironment. "As Kennan perceived it, the Soviet personality was neurotic,conspiratorial, and untrustworthy. Such impressions were only reinforcedwhen Stalin suddenly announced a nonaggression treaty with Hitler in August
1939, and later that year invaded the small, neutral state of Finland. Itseemed that Stalin and Hitler deserved each other. Hence, the reluctance ofsome to change their attitudes toward the Soviet Union when suddenly, in
June 1941, Germany invaded Russia and Stalin became "Uncle Joe."
Compounding the problem of historical distrust was the different way inwhich the two nations viewed foreign policy. Ever since John Winthrop hadspoken of Boston in 1630 as "a city upon a hill" that would serve as abeacon for the world, Americans had tended to see themselves as a chosenpeople with a distinctive mission to impart their faith and values to therest of humankind. Although all countries attempt to put the best facepossible on their military and diplomatic actions, Americans have seemedmore committed than most to describing their involvement in the world aspure and altruistic. Hence, even ventures like the Mexican War of 1846 - 48
- Clearly provoked by the United States in an effort to secure huge landmasses - were defended publicly as the fulfillment of a divine mission toextend American democracy to those deprived of it.
Reliance on the rhetoric of moralism was never more present than during
America's involvement in World War I. Despite its official posture ofneutrality, the United States had a vested interest in the victory of
England and France over Germany. America's own military security, her tradelines with England and France, economic and political control over Latin
America and South America - all would best be preserved if Germany weredefeated. Moreover, American banks and munition makers had investedmillions of dollars in the allied cause. Nevertheless, the issue ofnational self-interest rarely if ever surfaced in any presidentialstatement during the war. Instead, U.S. rhetoric presented America'sposition as totally idealistic in nature. The United States entered thewar, President Wilson declared, not for reasons of economic self-interest,but to "make the world safe for democracy." Our purpose was not to restorea balance of power in Europe, but to fight a war that would "end all wars"and produce "a peace without victory." Rather than seek a sphere ofinfluence for American power, the United States instead declared that itsought to establish a new form of internationalism based on self -determination for all peoples, freedom of the seas, the end of all economicbarriers between nations, and development of a new international orderbased on the principles of democracy.
America's historic reluctance to use arguments of self-interest as abasis for foreign policy undoubtedly reflected a belief that, in ademocracy, people would not support foreign ventures inconsistent withtheir own sense of themselves as a noble and just country. But theconsequences were to limit severely the flexibility necessary to amultifaceted and effective diplomacy, and to force national leaders toinvoke moral - even religious - idealism as a basis for actions that mightwell fall short of the expectations generated by moralistic visions.
The Soviet Union, by contrast, operated with few such constraints.
Although Soviet pronouncements on foreign policy tediously invoked therhetoric of capitalist imperialism, abstract principles meant far less thannational self-interest in arriving at foreign policy positions. Everyaction that the Soviet Union had taken since the Bolshevik revolution, fromthe peace treaty with the Kaiser to the 1939 Nazi-Soviet pact and Russianoccupation of the Baltic states reflected this policy of self-interest. As
Stalin told British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden during the war, "adeclaration I regard as algebra ... I prefer practical arithmetic. "Or, asthe Japanese ambassador to Moscow later said, "the Soviet authorities areextremely realistic and it is most difficult to persuade them with abstractarguments. "Clearly, both the United States and the Soviet Union sawforeign policy as involving a combination of self-interest and ideologicalprinciple. Yet the history of the two countries suggested that principlewas far more a consideration in the formulation of American foreign policy,while self-interest-purely defined-controlled Soviet actions.
The difference became relevant during the 1930s as Franklin Rooseveltattempted to find some way to move American public opinion back to a spiritof internationalism. After World War I, Americans had felt betrayed by theabandonment of Wilsonian principles. Persuaded that the war itselfrepresented a mischievous conspiracy by munitions makers and bankers to get
America involved, Americans had preferred to opt for isolation and
"normalcy" rather than participate in the ambiguities of what so clearlyappeared to be a corrupt international order. Now, Roosevelt set out toreverse those perceptions. He understood the dire consequences of Naziambitions for world hegemony. Yet to pose the issue strictly as one of self -interest offered little chance of success given the depth of America'srevulsion toward internationalism. The task of education was immense. Astime went on, Roosevelt relied more and more on the traditional moralrhetoric of American values as a means of justifying the internationalinvolvement that he knew must inevitably lead to war. Thus, throughout the
1930s he repeatedly discussed Nazi aggression as a direct threat to themost cherished American beliefs in freedom of speech, freedom of religion,and freedom of occupational choice. When German actions corroborated thepresident's simple words, the opportunity presented itself for carrying thenation toward another great crusade on behalf of democracy, freedom, andpeace. Roosevelt wished to avoid the errors of Wilsonian overstatement, buthe understood the necessity of generating moral fervor as a means of movingthe nation toward the intervention he knew to be necessary if both
America's self-interest-and her moral principles-were to be preserved.
The Atlantic Charter represented the embodiment of Roosevelt's questfor moral justification of American involvement. Presented to the worldafter the president and Prime Minister Churchill met off the coast of
Newfoundland in the summer of 1941, the Charter set forth the common goalsthat would guide America over the next few years. There would be no secretcommitments, the President said. Britain and America sought no territorialaggrandizement. They would oppose any violation of the right to self -government for all peoples. They stood for open trade, free exchange ofideas, freedom of worship and expression, and the creation of aninternational organization to preserve and protect future peace. This wouldbe a war fought for freedom-freedom from fear, freedom from want, freedomof religion, freedom from the old politics of balance-of-power diplomacy.
Roosevelt deeply believed in those ideals and saw no inconsistencybetween the moral principles they represented and American self-interest.
Yet these very commitments threatened to generate misunderstanding andconflict with the Soviet Union whose own priorities were much more directlyexpressed in terms of "practical arithmetic." Russia wanted security. The
Soviet Union sought a sphere of influence over which it could haveunrestricted control. It wished territorial boundaries that would reflectthe concessions won through military conflict. All these objectives -potentially-ran counter to the Atlantic Charter. Roosevelt himself-neverafraid of inconsistency-often talked the same language. Frequently, hespoke of guaranteeing the USSR "measures of legitimate security" onterritorial questions, and he envisioned a postwar world in which the "fourpolicemen "-the superpowers-would manage the world.
But Roosevelt also understood that the American public would not acceptthe public embrace of such positions. A rationale of narrow self-interestwas not acceptable, especially if that self-interest led to abandoning theideals of the Atlantic Charter. In short, the different ways in which the
Soviet Union and the United States articulated their objectives for thewar-and formulated their foreign policy-threatened to compromise theprospect for long-term cooperation. The language of universalism and thelanguage of balance-of-power politics were incompatible, at least intheory. Thus, the United States and the Soviet Union entered the warburdened not only by their deep mistrust of each other's motivations andsystems of government, but also by a significantly different emphasis onwhat should constitute the major rationale for fighting the war.
1.2 Causes and Interpretations.
Any historian who studies the Cold War must come to grips with a series of questions, which, even if unanswerable in a definitive fashion, nevertheless compel examination. Was the Cold War inevitable? If not, how could it have been avoided? What role did personalities play? Were there points at which different courses of action might have been followed? What economic factors were central? What ideological causes? Which historical forces? At what juncture did alternative possibilities become invalid? When was the die cast? Above all, what were the primary reasons for defining the world in such a polarized and ideological framework?
The simplest and easiest response is to conclude that Soviet-American confrontation was so deeply rooted in differences of values, economic systems, or historical experiences that only extraordinary action-by individuals or groups-could have prevented the conflict. One version of the inevitability hypothesis would argue that the Soviet Union, given its commitment to the ideology of communism, was dedicated to worldwide revolution and would use any and every means possible to promote the demise of the West. According to this view-based in large part on the rhetoric of Stalin and Lenin-world revolution constituted the sole priority of Soviet policy. Even the appearance of accommodation was a
Soviet design to soften up capitalist states for eventual confrontation.
As defined, admittedly in oversimplified fashion, by George Kennan in his famous 1947 article on containment, Russian diplomacy "moves along the prescribed path, like a persistent toy automobile, wound up and headed in a given direction, stopping only when it meets some unanswerable force. "
Soviet subservience to a universal, religious creed ruled out even the possibility of mutual concessions, since even temporary accommodation would be used by the Russians as part of their grand scheme to secure world domination.
A second version of the same hypothesis-argued by some American revisionist historians-contends that the endless demands of capitalism for new markets propelled the United States into a course of intervention and imperialism. According to this argument, a capitalist society can survive only by opening new areas for exploitation. Without the development of multinational corporations, strong ties with German capitalists, and free trade across national boundaries, America would revert to the depression of the prewar years. Hence, an aggressive internationalism became the only means through which the ruling class of the United States could retain hegemony. In support of this argument, historians point to the number of
American policymakers who explicitly articulated an economic motivation for US foreign policy. "We cannot expect domestic prosperity under our system," Assistant Secretary of State Dean Acheson said, "without a constantly expanding trade with other nations." Echoing the same theme, the State Department's William Clayton declared: "We need markets-big markets-around the world in which to buy and sell.... We've got to export three times as much as we exported just before the war if we want to keep our industry running somewhere near capacity. " According to this argument, economic necessity motivated the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall
Plan, and the vigorous efforts of US policymakers to open up Eastern
Europe for trade and investment. Within such a frame of reference, it was the capitalist economic system-not Soviet commitment to world revolution-that made the Cold War unavoidable.
Still a third version of the inevitability hypothesis-partly based onthe first two-would insist that historical differences between the twosuperpowers and their systems of government made any efforts toward postwarcooperation almost impossible. Russia had always been deeply suspicious ofthe West, and under Stalin that suspicion had escalated into paranoia, with
Soviet leaders fearing that any opening of channels would ultimatelydestroy their own ability to retain total mastery over the Russian people.
The West's failure to implement early promises of a second front and thesubsequent divisions of opinion over how to treat occupied territory hadprofoundly strained any possible basis of trust. From an Americanperspective, in turn, it stretched credibility to expect a nation committedto human rights to place confidence in a ruthless dictator, who in one
Yugoslav's words, had single-handedly been responsible for more Sovietdeaths than all the armies of Nazi Germany. Through the purges,collectivization, and mass imprisonment of Russian citizens, Stalin hadpresided over the killing of 20 million of his own people. How then couldhe be trusted to respect the rights of others? According to this argument,only the presence of a common enemy had made possible even short-termsolidarity between Russia and the United States; in the absence of a Germanfoe, natural antagonisms were bound to surface. America had one system ofpolitics, Russia another, and as Truman declared in 1948, "a totalitarianstate is no different whether you call it Nazi, fascist, communist, or
Franco Spain. "
Yet, in retrospect, these arguments for inevitability tell only part ofthe story. Notwithstanding the Soviet Union's rhetorical commitment to anideology of world revolution, there is abundant evidence of Russia'swillingness to forego ideological purity in the cause of national interest.
Stalin, after all, had turned away from world revolution in committinghimself to building "socialism in one country." Repeatedly, he indicatedhis readiness to betray the communist movement in China and to accept theleadership of Chiang Kai-shek. George Kennan recalled the Soviet leader
"snorting rather contemptuously... because one of our people asked themwhat they were going to give to China when [the war] was over. "" We have ahundred cities of our own to build in the Soviet Far East, "Stalin hadresponded. "If anybody is going to give anything to the Far East, I thinkit's you. "Similarly, Stalin refused to give any support to communists in
Greece during their rebellion against British domination there. As late as
1948 he told the vice-premier of Yugoslavia, "What do you think,... That
Great Britain and the United States. . . will permit you to break theirlines of communication in the Mediterranean? Nonsense. . . the uprising in
Greece must be stopped, and as quickly as possible. "
Nor are the other arguments for inevitability totally persuasive.
Without question, America's desire for commercial markets played a role inthe strategy of the Cold War. As Truman said in 1949, devotion to freedomof enterprise "is part and parcel of what we call America." Yet was theneed for markets sufficient to force a confrontation that ultimately woulddivert precious resources from other, more productive use? Throughout mostof its history, Wall Street has opposed a bellicose position in foreignpolicy. Similarly, although historical differences are important, it makesno sense to regard them as determinative. After all, the war led toextraordinary examples of cooperation that bridged these differences; ifthey could be overcome once, then why not again? Thus, while each of thearguments for inevitability reflects truths that contributed to the Cold
War, none offers an explanation sufficient of itself, for contending thatthe Cold War was unavoidable.
A stronger case, it seems, can be made for the position that the Cold
War was unnecessary, or at least that conflicts could have been handled ina manner that avoided bipolarization and the rhetoric of an ideologicalcrusade. At no time did Russia constitute a military threat to the United
States. "Economically," U.S. Naval Intelligence reported in 1946, "the
Soviet Union is exhausted .... The USSR is not expected to take any actionin the next five years which might develop into hostility with Anglo
Americans. "Notwithstanding the Truman administration's public statementsabout a Soviet threat, Russia had cut its army from 11.5 to 3 million menafter the war. In 1948, its military budget amounted to only half of thatof the United States. Even militant anticommunists like John Foster Dullesacknowledged that "the Soviet leadership does not want and would notconsciously risk "a military confrontation with the West. Indeed, soexaggerated was American rhetoric about Russia's threat that Hanson
Baldwin, military expert of the New York Times, compared the claims of ourarmed forces to the "shepherd who cried wolf, wolf, wolf, when there was nowolf. "Thus, on purely factual grounds, there existed no military basis forthe fear that the Soviet Union was about to seize world domination, despitethe often belligerent pose Russia took on political issues.
A second, somewhat more problematic, argument for the thesis ofavoidability consists of the extent to which Russian leaders appeared readyto abide by at least some agreements made during the war. Key, here, is theunderstanding reached by Stalin and Churchill during the fall of 1944 onthe division of Europe into spheres of influence. According to thatunderstanding, Russia was to dominate Romania, have a powerful voice over
Bulgaria, and share influence in other Eastern European countries, while
Britain and America were to control Greece. By most accounts, thatunderstanding was implemented. Russia refused to intervene on behalf ofcommunist insurgency in Greece. While retaining rigid control over Romania,she provided at least a "fig-leaf of democratic procedure"-sufficient tosatisfy the British. For two years the USSR permitted the election ofnoncommunist or coalition regimes in both Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The
Finns, meanwhile, were permitted to choose a noncommunist government and topractice Western-style democracy as long as their country maintained afriendly foreign policy toward their neighbor on the east. Indeed, to thisday, Finland remains an example of what might have evolved had earlierwartime understandings on both sides been allowed to continue.
What then went wrong? First, it seems clear that both sides perceivedthe other as breaking agreements that they thought had been made. Bysigning a separate peace settlement with the Lublin Poles, imprisoning thesixteen members of the Polish underground, and imposing-without regard fordemocratic appearances-total hegemony on Poland, the Soviets had broken thespirit, if not the letter, of the Yalta accords. Similarly, they blatantlyviolated the agreement made by both powers to withdraw from Iran once thewar was over, thus precipitating the first direct threat of militaryconfrontation during the Cold War. In their attitude toward Eastern Europe,reparations, and peaceful cooperation with the West, the Soviets exhibitedincreasing rigidity and suspicion after April 1945. On the other hand,
Stalin had good reason to accuse the United States of reneging on compactsmade during the war. After at least tacitly accepting Russia's right to asphere of influence in Eastern Europe, the West seemed suddenly to changepositions and insist on Western-style democracies and economies. As thehistorian Robert Daliek has shown, Roosevelt and Churchill gave everyindication at Tehran and Yalta that they acknowledged the Soviet's need tohave friendly governments in Eastern Europe. Roosevelt seemed to careprimarily about securing token or cosmetic concessions toward democraticprocesses while accepting the substance of Russian domination. Instead,misunderstanding developed over the meaning of the Yalta accords, Trumanconfronted Molotov with demands that the Soviets saw as inconsistent withprior understandings, and mutual suspicion rather than cooperation assumeddominance in relations between the two superpowers.
It is this area of misperception and misunderstanding that historianshave focused on recently as most critical to the emergence of the Cold War.
Presumably, neither side had a master plan of how to proceed once the warended. Stalin's ambitions, according to recent scholarship, were ill -defined, or at least amenable to modification depending on America'sposture. The United States, in turn, gave mixed signals, with Rooseveltimplying to every group his agreement with their point of view, yetultimately keeping his personal intentions secret. If, in fact, both sidescould have agreed to a sphere-of-influence policy-albeit with somemodifications to satisfy American political opinion-there could perhapshave been a foundation for continued accommodation. Clearly, the United
States intended to retain control over its sphere of influence,particularly in Greece, Italy, and Turkey. Moreover, the United Statesinsisted on retaining total domination over the Western hemisphere,consistent with the philosophy of the Monroe Doctrine. If the Soviets hadbeen allowed similar control over their sphere of influence in Eastern
Europe, there might have existed a basis for compromise. As John McCloyasked at the time, "[why was it necessary] to have our cake and eat it too?
. . . To be free to operate under this regional arrangement in South
America and at the same time intervene promptly in Europe. "If the United
States and Russia had both acknowledged the spheres of influence implicitin their wartime agreements, perhaps a different pattern of relationshipsmight have emerged in the postwar world.
The fact that such a pattern did not emerge raises two issues, at leastfrom an American perspective. The first is whether different leaders oradvisors might have achieved different foreign policy results. Somehistorians believe that Roosevelt, with his subtlety and skill, would havefound a way to promote collaboration with the Russians, whereas Truman,with his short temper, inexperience, and insecurity, blundered intounnecessary and harmful confrontations. Clearly, Roosevelt himself-justbefore his death-was becoming more and more concerned about Sovietintransigence and aggression. Nevertheless, he had always believed thatthrough personal pressure and influence, he could find a way to persaude
"uncle Joe." On the basis of what evidence we have, there seems good reasonto believe that the Russians did place enormous trust in FDR. Perhaps-justperhaps-Roosevelt could have found a way to talk "practical arithmetic"with Stalin rather than algebra and discover a common ground. Certainly, ifrecent historians are correct in seeing the Cold War as caused by both
Stalin's undefined ambitions and America's failure to communicateeffectively and consistently its view on where it would draw the line withthe Russians, then Roosevelt's long history of interaction with the Sovietswould presumably have placed him in a better position to negotiate than theinexperienced Truman.
The second issue is more complicated, speaking to a political problemwhich beset both Roosevelt and Truman-namely, the ability of an Americanpresident to formulate and win support for a foreign policy on the basis ofnational self-interest rather than moral purity. At some point in the past,an American diplomat wrote in 1967:
[T] here crept into the ideas of Americans about foreign policy ... a histrionic note, ... a desire to appear as something greater perhaps than one actually was. ... It was inconceivable that any war in which we were involved could be less than momentous and decisive for the future of humanity. ... As each war ended, ... we took appeal to universalistic,
Utopian ideals, related not to the specifics of national interest but to legalistic and moralistic concepts that seemed better to accord with the pretentious significance we had attached to our war effort.
As a consequence, the diplomat went on, it became difficult to pursue apolicy not defined by the language of "angels or devils," "heroes" or
"blackguards."
Clearly, Roosevelt faced such a dilemma in proceeding to mobilize
American support for intervention in the war against Nazism. And Trumanencountered the same difficulty in seeking to define a policy with which tomeet Soviet postwar objectives. Both presidents, of course, participated inand reflected the political culture that constrained their options.
Potentially at least, Roosevelt seemed intent on fudging the differencebetween self-interest and moralism. He perceived one set of objectives asconsistent with reaching an accommodation with the Soviets, and another setof goals as consistent with retaining popular support for his diplomacy athome. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that he planned-in a very
Machiavellian way-to use rhetoric and appearances as a means of disguisinghis true intention: to pursue a strategy of self-interest. It seems lessclear that Truman had either the subtlety or the wish to follow a similarly
Machiavellian course. But if he had, the way might have been opened toquite a different-albeit politically risky-series of policies.
None of this, of course, would have guaranteed the absence of conflictin Eastern Europe, Iran, or Turkey. Nor could any action of an Americanpresident-however much rooted in self-interest-have obviated the personaland political threat posed by Stalinist tyranny and ruthlessness,particularly if Stalin himself had chosen, for whatever reason, to act outhis most aggressive and paranoid instincts. But if a sphere-of-influenceagreement had been possible, there is some reason to think-in light ofinitial Soviet acceptance of Western-style governments in Hungary,
Czechoslovakia, and Finland-that the iron curtain might not have descendedin the way that it did. In all historical sequences, one action builds onanother. Thus, steps toward cooperation rather than confrontation mighthave created a momentum, a frame of reference and a basis of mutual trust,that could have made unnecessary the total ideological bipolarization thatevolved by 1948. In short, if the primary goals of each superpower had beenacknowledged and implemented-security for the Russians, some measure ofpluralism in Eastern European countries for the United States, and economicinterchange between the two blocs-it seems conceivable that the world mighthave avoided the stupidity, the fear, and the hysteria of the Cold War.
As it was, of course, very little of the above scenario did take place.
After the confrontation in Iran, the Soviet declaration of a five-yearplan, Churchill's Fulton, Missouri, speech, and the breakdown ofnegotiations on an American loan, confrontation between the two superpowersseemed irrevocable. It is difficult to imagine that the momentum buildingtoward the Cold War could have been reversed after the winter and spring of
1946. Thereafter, events assumed an almost inexorable momentum, with bothsides using moralistic rhetoric and ideological denunciation to pillory theother. In the United States it became incumbent on the president-in orderto secure domestic political support-to defend the Truman Doctrine and the
Marshall Plan in universalistic, moral terms. Thus, we became engaged, notin an effort to assure jobs and security, but in a holy war against evil.
Stalin, in turn, gave full vent to his crusade to eliminate any vestige offree thought or national independence in Eastern Europe. Reinhold Niebuhrmight have been speaking for both sides when he said in 1948, "we cannotafford any more compromises. We will have to stand at every point in ourfar flung lines. "
The tragedy, of course, was that such a policy offered no room forintelligence or flexibility. If the battle in the world was between goodand evil, believers and nonbelievers, anyone who questioned the wisdom ofestablished policy risked dismissal as a traitor or worse. In the Soviet
Union the Gulag Archipelago of concentration camps and executions was theprice of failing to conform to the party line. But the United States paid aprice as well. An ideological frame of reference had emerged through whichall other information was filtered. The mentality of the Cold War shapedeverything, defining issues according to moralistic assumptions, regardlessof objective reality. It had been George Kennan's telegram in February 1946that helped to provide the intellectual basis for this frame of referenceby portraying the Soviet Union as "a political force committed fanatically"to confrontation with the United States and domination of the world. It wasalso George Kennan twenty years later who so searchingly criticized thosewho insisted on seeing foreign policy as a battle of angels and devils,heroes and blackguards. And ironically, it was Kennan yet again whodeclared in the 1970s that "the image of a Stalinist Russia, poised andyearning to attack the west,. . . was largely a product of the westernimagination. "
But for more than a generation, that image would shape American lifeand world politics. The price was astronomical-and perhaps-avoidable.
Chapter 2: The Cold War Chronology.
2.1 The War Years.
Whatever tensions existed before the war, conflicts over military anddiplomatic issues during the war proved sufficiently grave to causeadditional mistrust. Two countries that in the past had shared almost nocommon ground now found themselves intimately tied to each other, withlittle foundation of mutual confidence on which to build. The problems thatresulted clustered in two areas: (1) how much aid the West would provide toalleviate the disproportionate burden borne by the Soviet Union in fightingthe war; and (2) how to resolve the dilemmas of making peace, occupyingconquered territory, and defining postwar responsibilities. Inevitably,each issue became inextricably bound to the others, posing problems ofstatecraft and good faith that perhaps went beyond the capacity of anymortal to solve.
The central issue dividing the allies involved how much support the
United States and Britain would offer to mitigate, then relieve, thedevastation being sustained by the Soviet people. Stated bluntly, the
Soviet Union bore the massive share of Nazi aggression. The statisticsalone are overwhelming. Soviet deaths totaled more than 18 million duringthe war-sixty times the three hundred thousand lives lost by the United
States. Seventy thousand Soviet villages were destroyed, $ 128 billiondollars worth of property leveled to the ground. Leningrad, the crown jewelof Russia's cities, symbolized the suffering experienced at the hands ofthe Nazis. Filled with art and beautiful architecture, the former capitalof Russia came under siege by German armies almost immediately after theinvasion of the Soviet Union. When the attack began, the city boasted apopulation of 3 million citizens. At the end, only 600,000 remained. Therewas no food, no fuel, no hope. More than a million starved, and somesurvived by resorting to cannibalism. Yet the city endured, the Nazis wererepelled, and the victory that came with survival helped launch thecampaign that would ultimately crush Hitler's tyranny.
Such suffering provided the backdrop for a bitter controversy overwhether the United States and Britain were doing enough to assume their ownjust share of the fight. Roosevelt understood that Russia's battle was
America's. "The Russian armies are killing more Axis personnel anddestroying more Axis materiel, "he wrote General Douglas MacArthur in 1942,
"than all the other twenty-five United Nations put together." As soon asthe Germans invaded Russia, the president ordered that lend-lease materialbe made immediately available to the Soviet Union, instructing his personalaide to get $ 22 million worth of supplies on their way by July 25-one monthafter the German invasion. Roosevelt knew that, unless the Soviets werehelped quickly, they would be forced out of the war, leaving the United
States in an untenable position. "If [only] the Russians could hold the
Germans until October 1, "the president said. At a Cabinet meeting early in
August, Roosevelt declared himself "sick and tired of hearing... Whatwas on order "; he wanted to hear only" what was on the water. "Roosevelt'scommitment to lend-lease reflected his deep conviction that aid to the
Soviets was both the most effective way of combating German aggression andthe strongest means of building a basis of trust with Stalin in order tofacilitate postwar cooperation. "I do not want to be in the same positionas the English, "Roosevelt told his Secretary of the Treasury in 1942." The
English promised the Russians two divisions. They failed. They promisedthem to help in the Caucasus. They failed. Every promise the English havemade to the Russians, they have fallen down on. . . . The only reason westand so well ... is that up to date we have kept our promises. "Over andover again Roosevelt intervened directly and personally to expedite theshipment of supplies. "Please get out the list and please, with my fullauthority, use a heavy hand, "he told one assistant." Act as a burr underthe saddle and get things moving! "
But even Roosevelt's personal involvement could not end the problemsthat kept developing around the lend-lease program. Inevitably,bureaucratic tangles delayed shipment of necessary supplies. Furthermore,
German submarine assaults sank thousands of tons of weaponry. In just onemonth in 1942, twenty-three of thirty-seven merchant vessels on their wayto the Soviet Union were destroyed, forcing a cancellation of shipments to
Murmansk. Indeed, until late summer of 1942, the Allies lost more ships insubmarine attacks than they were able to build.
Above all, old suspicions continued to creep into the ongoing processof negotiating and distributing lend-lease supplies. Americans who hadlearned during the purges to regard Stalin as "a sort of unwashed Genghis
Khan with blood dripping from his fingertips "could not believe that he hadchanged his colors overnight and was now to be viewed as a gentle friend.
Many Americans believed that they were saving the Soviet Union with theirsupplies, without recognizing the extent of Soviet suffering orappreciating the fact that the Russians were helping to save American livesby their sacrifice on the battlefield. Soviet officials, in turn, believedthat their American counterparts overseeing the shipments were notnecessarily doing all that they might to implement the promises made by thepresident. Americans expected gratitude. Russians expected supplies. Bothexpectations were justified, yet the conflict reflected the extent to whichunderlying distrust continued to poison the prospect of cooperation.
"Frankly," FDR told one subordinate, "if I was a Russian, I would feel that
I had been given the runaround in the United States. "Yet with equaljustification, Americans resented Soviet ingratitude. "The Russianauthorities seem to want to cover up the fact that they are receivingoutside help, "American Ambassador Standley told a Moscow press conferencein March 1943. "Apparently they want their people to believe that the Red
Army is fighting this war alone. "Clearly, the battle against Nazi Germanywas not the only conflict taking place.
Yet the disputes over lend-lease proved minor compared to the issue ofa second front-what one historian has called "the acid test of Anglo-
American intentions. "However much help the United States could provide inthe way of war materiel, the decisive form of relief that Stalin sought wasthe actual involvement of American and British soldiers in Western Europe.
Only such an invasion could significantly relieve the pressure of massive
German divisions on the eastern front. During the years 1941-44, fewer than
10 percent of Germany's troops were in the west, while nearly three hundreddivisions were committed to conquering Russia. If the Soviet Union was tosurvive, and the Allies to secure victory, it was imperative that Americanand British troops force a diversion of German troops to the west and helpmake possible the pincer movement from east and west that would eventuallyannihilate the fascist foe.
Roosevelt understood this all too well. Indeed, he appears to havewished nothing more than the most rapid possible development of the secondfront. In part, he saw such action as the only means to deflect a Sovietpush for acceptance of Russia's pre-World War II territorial acquisitions,particularly in the Baltic states and Finland. Such acquisitions would notonly be contrary to the Atlantic Charter and America's commitment to self -determination; they would also undermine the prospect of securing politicalsupport in America for international postwar cooperation. Hence, Roosevelthoped to postpone, until victory was achieved, any final decisions onissues of territory. Shrewdly, the president understood that meeting Sovietdemands for direct military assistance through a second front would offerthe most effective answer to Russia's territorial aspirations.
Roosevelt had read the Soviet attitude correctly. In 1942, Sovietforeign minister Molotov readily agreed to withdraw his territorial demandsin deference to U.S. concerns because the second front was so much moredecisive an issue. When Molotov asked whether the Allies could undertake asecond front operation that would draw off forty German divisions from theeastern front, the president replied that it could and that it would.
Roosevelt cabled Churchill that he was "more anxious than ever" for a cross -channel attack in August 1942 so that Molotov would be able to "carry backsome real results of his mission and give a favorable report to Stalin. "Atthe end of their 1942 meeting, Roosevelt pledged to Molotov-and through himto Stalin-that a second front would be established that year. The presidentthen proceeded to mobilize his own military advisors to develop plans forsuch an attack.
But Roosevelt could not deliver. Massive logistical and productionproblems obstructed any possibility of invading Western Europe on thetimetable Roosevelt had promised. As a result, despite Roosevelt's own bestintentions and the commitment of his military staff, he could not implementhis desire to proceed. In addition, Roosevelt repeatedly encounteredobjections from Churchill and the British military establishment, stilltraumatized by the memory of the bloodletting that had occurred in thetrench fighting of World War I. For Churchill, engagement of the Nazis in
North Africa and then through the "soft underbelly" of Europe-Sicily and
Italy-offered a better prospect for success. Hence, after promising Stalina second front in August 1942, Roosevelt had to withdraw the pledge and askfor delay of the second front until the spring of 1943. When that datearrived, he was forced to pull back yet again for political and logisticalreasons. By the time D-Day finally dawned on June 6, 1944, the Western
Allies had broken their promise on the single most critical military issueof the war three times. On each occasion, there had been ample reason forthe delay, but given the continued heavy burden placed on the Soviet Union,it was perhaps understandable that some Russian leaders viewed America'sdelay on the second front question with suspicion, sarcasm, and anger. When
D-Day arrived, Stalin acknowledged the operation to be one of the greatestmilitary ventures of human history. Still, the squabbles that preceded D-
Day contributed substantially to the suspicions and tension that alreadyexisted between the two nations.
Another broad area of conflict emerged over who would control occupiedareas once the war ended? How would peace be negotiated? The principles ofthe Atlantic Charter presumed establishment of democratic, freely elected,and representative governments in every area won back from the Nazis. Ifuniversalism were to prevail, each country liberated from Germany wouldhave the opportunity to determine its own political structure throughdemocratic means that would ensure representation of all factions of thebody politic. If "sphere of influence" policies were implemented, bycontrast, the major powers would dictate such decisions in a mannerconsistent with their own self-interest. Ultimately, this issue wouldbecome the decisive point of confrontation during the Cold War, reflectingthe different state systems and political values of the Soviets and
Americans; but even in the midst of the fighting, the Allies foundthemselves in major disagreement, sowing seeds of distrust that boded illfor the future. Since no plans were established in advance on how to dealwith these issues, they were handled on a case by case basis, in eachinstance reinforcing the suspicions already present between the Soviet
Union and the West.
Notwithstanding the Atlantic Charter, Britain and the United Statesproceeded on a de facto basis to implement policies at variance withuniversalism. Thus, for example, General Dwight Eisenhower was authorizedto reach an accommodation with Admiral Darlan in North Africa as a means ofavoiding an extended military campaign to defeat the Vichy, pro-fascistcollaborators who controlled that area. From the perspective of militarynecessity and the preservation of life, it made sense to compromise one'sideals in such a situation. Yet the precedent inevitably raised problemswith regard to allied efforts to secure self-determination elsewhere.
The issue arose again during the Allied invasion of Italy. There, too,concern with expediting military victory and securing political stabilitycaused Britain and the United States to negotiate with the fascist Badoglioregime. "We cannot be put into a position," Churchill said, "where our twoarmies are doing all the fighting but Russians have a veto. "Yet Stalinbitterly resented being excluded from participation in the Italiannegotiations. The Soviet Union protested vigorously the failure toestablish a tripartite commission to conduct all occupation negotiations.
It was time, Stalin said, to stop viewing Russia as "a passive thirdobserver. ... It is impossible to tolerate such a situation any longer. "Inthe end, Britain and the United States offered the token concession ofgiving the Soviets an innocuous role on the advisory commission dealingwith Italy, but the primary result of the Italian experience was toreemphasize a crucial political reality: when push came to shove, those whoexercised military control in an immediate situation would also exercisepolitical control over any occupation regime.
The shoe was on the other foot when it came to Western desires to havea voice over Soviet actions in the Balkan states, particularly Romania. Bynot giving Russia an opportunity to participate in the Italian surrender,the West-in effect-helped legitimize Russia's desire to proceedunilaterally in Eastern Europe. Although both Churchill and Roosevelt were
"acutely conscious of the great importance of the Balkan situation" andwished to "take advantage of" any opportunity to exercise influence in thatarea, the simple fact was that Soviet troops were in control. Churchill-andprivately Roosevelt as well-accepted the consequences. "The occupyingforces had the power in the area where their arms were present, "Rooseveltnoted, "and each knew that the other could not force things to an issue."
But the contradiction between the stated idealistic aims of the war effortand such realpolitik would come back to haunt the prospect for postwarcollaboration, particularly in the areas of Poland and other east Europeancountries.
Moments of conflict, of course, took place within the context of day-to -day cooperation in meeting immediate wartime needs. Sometimes, suchcooperation seemed deep and genuine enough to provide a basis forovercoming suspicion and conflict of interest. At the Moscow foreignministers conference in the fall of 1943, the Soviets proved responsive to
U.S. concerns. Reassured that there would indeed be a second front in
Europe in 1944, the Russians strongly endorsed a postwar internationalorganization to preserve the peace. More important, they indicated theywould join the war against Japan as soon as Germany was defeated, andappeared willing to accept the Chiang Kaishek government in China as amajor participant in world politics. In some ways, these were a series ofquid pro quos. In exchange for the second front, Russia had madeconcessions on issues of critical importance to Britain and the United
States. Nevertheless, the results were encouraging. FDR reported that theconference had created "a psychology of ... excellent feeling." Instead ofbeing "cluttered with suspicion," the discussions had occurred in anatmosphere that "was amazingly good."
The same spirit continued at the first meeting of Stalin, Churchill,and Roosevelt in Tehran during November and early December 1943. Committedto winning Stalin as a friend, FDR stayed at the Soviet Embassy, metprivately with Stalin, aligned himself with the Soviet leader against
Churchill on a number of issues, and even went so far as to taunt Churchill
"about his Britishness, about John Bull," in an effort to forge an informal
"anti-imperial" alliance between the United States and the Soviet Union. Aspirit of cooperation prevailed, with the wartime leaders agreeing that the
Big Four would have the power to police any postwar settlements (clearlyconsistent with Stalin's commitment to a "sphere of influence" approach),reaffirming plans for a joint military effort against Japan, and even-aftermuch difficulty-appearing to find a common approach to the difficulties of
Poland and Eastern Europe. When it was all over, FDR told the Americanpeople: "I got along fine with Marshall Stalin ... I believe he is trulyrepresentative of the heart and soul of Russia; and I believe that we aregoing to get along very well with him and the Russian people-very wellindeed. "When pressed on what kind of a person the Soviet leader was,
Roosevelt responded:
"I would call him something like me, ... a realist."
The final conference of Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt at Yalta in
February 1945 appeared at the time to carry forward the partnership,although in retrospect it would become clear that the facade of unity wasbuilt on a foundation of misperceptions rooted in the different values,priorities, and political ground rules of the two societies. Stalin seemedto recognize Roosevelt's need to present postwar plans-for domesticpolitical reasons-as consistent with democratic, universalistic principles.
Roosevelt, in turn, appreciated Stalin's need for friendly governments onhis borders. The three leaders agreed on concrete plans for Sovietparticipation in the Japanese war, and Stalin reiterated his support for acoalition government in China with Chiang Kaishek assuming a position ofleadership. Although some of Roosevelt's aides were skeptical of theagreements made, most came back confident that they had succeeded in layinga basis for continued partnership. As Harry Hopkins later recalled, "wereally believed in our hearts that this was the dawn of the new day we hadall been praying for. The Russians have proved that they can be reasonableand far-seeing and there wasn't any doubt in the minds of the president orany of us that we could live with them and get along with them peacefullyfor as far into the future as any of us could imagine. "
In fact, two disquietingly different perceptions of the Soviet Unionexisted as the war drew to an end. Some Washington officials believed thatthe mystery of Russia was no mystery at all, simply a reflection of anational history in which suspicion of outsiders was natural, givenrepeated invasions from Western Europe and rampant hostility towardcommunism on the part of Western powers. Former Ambassador to Moscow Joseph
Davies believed that the way to cut through that suspicion was to adopt
"the simple approach of assuming that what they say, they mean." On thebasis of his personal negotiations with the Russians, presidential aide
Harry Hopkins shared the same confidence.
The majority of well-informed Americans, however, endorsed the oppositeposition. It was folly, one newspaper correspondent wrote, "to prettify
Stalin, whose internal homicide record is even longer than Hitler's. "
Hitler and Stalin were two of the same breed, former Ambassador to Russia
William Bullitt insisted. Each wanted to spread his power "to the ends ofthe earth. Stalin, like Hitler, will not stop. He can only be stopped. "
According to Bullitt, any alternative view implied "a conversion of Stalinas striking as the conversion of Saul on the road to Damascus. "Senator
Robert Taft agreed. It made no sense, he insisted, to base U.S. policytoward the Soviet Union "on the delightful theory that Mr. Stalin in theend will turn out to have an angelic nature. "Drawing on the historicalprecedents of the purge trials and traditional American hostility tocommunism, totalitarianism, and Stalin, those who held this point of viewsaw little hope of compromise. "There is as little difference betweencommunism and fascism, "Monsignor Fulton J. Sheen said," as there isbetween burglary and larceny. "The only appropriate response was force.
Instead of "leaning over backward to be nice to the descendents of Genghis
Khan, "General George Patton suggested," [we] should dictate to them and doit now and in no uncertain terms. "Within such a frame of reference, thelessons of history and of ideological incompatibility seemed to permit nopossibility of compromise.
But Roosevelt clearly felt that there was a third way, a path of mutualaccommodation that would sustain and nourish the prospects of postwarpartnership without ignoring the realities of geopolitics. The choice inhis mind was clear. "We shall have to take the responsibility for worldcollaboration, "he told Congress," or we shall have to bear theresponsibility for another world conflict. "President Roosevelt was neitherpolitically naive nor stupid. Even though committed to the Atlantic
Charter's ideals of self-determination and territorial integrity, herecognized the legitimate need of the Soviet Unionfor national security.
For him, the process of politics-informed by thirty-five years of skilledpractice-involved striking a deal that both sides could live with.
Roosevelt acknowledged the brutality, the callousness, the tyranny of the
Soviet system. Indeed, in 1940 he had called Russia as absolute adictatorship as existed anywhere. But that did not mean a solution wasimpossible, or that one should withdraw from the struggle to find a basisfor world peace. As he was fond of saying about negotiations with Russia,
"it is permitted to walk with the devil until the bridge is crossed."
The problem was that, as Roosevelt defined the task of finding a pathof accommodation, it rested solely on his shoulders. The presidentpossessed an almost mystical confidence in his own capacity to breakthrough policy differences based on economic structures and politicalsystems, and to develop a personal relationship of trust that wouldtranscend impersonal forces of division. "I know you will not mind my beingbrutally frank when I tell you, "he wrote Churchill in 1942," [that] Ithink I can personally handle Stalin better than either your Foreign Officeor my State Department. Stalin hates the guts of all your top people. Hethinks he likes me better, and I hope he will continue to do so. "
Notwithstanding the seeming naivete of such statements, Roosevelt appearedright, in at least this one regard. The Soviets did seem to place theirfaith in him, perhaps thinking that American foreign policy was as much aproduct of one man's decisions as their own. Roosevelt evidently thoughtthe same way, telling Bullitt, in one of their early foreign policydiscussions, "it's my responsibility and not yours; and I'm going to playmy hunch. "
The tragedy, of course, was that the man who perceived that fosteringworld peace was his own personal responsibility never lived to carry outhis vision. Long in declining health, suffering from advancedarteriosclerosis and a serious cardiac problem, he had gone to Warm
Springs, Georgia, to recover from the ordeal of Yalta and the congressionalsession. On April 12, Roosevelt suffered a massive cerebral hemorrhage anddied. As word spread across the country, the stricken look on people'sfaces told those who had not yet heard the news the awful dimensions ofwhat had happened. "He was the only president I ever knew," one woman said.
In London, Churchill declared that he felt as if he had suffered a physicalblow. Stalin greeted the American ambassador in silence, holding his handfor thirty seconds. The leader of the world's greatest democracy would notlive to see the victory he had striven so hard to achieve.
2.2 The Truman Doctrine.
Few people were less prepared for the challenge of becoming president.
Although well-read in history, Truman's experience in foreign policy wasminimal. His most famous comment on diplomacy had been a statement to areporter in 1941 that "if we see that Germany is winning [the war] we oughtto help Russia, and if Russia is winning we ought to help Germany and thatway let them kill as many as possible, although I don't want to see Hitlervictorious under any circumstances. "As vice-president, Truman had beenexcluded from all foreign policy discussions. He knew nothing about the
Manhattan Project. The new president, Henry Stimson noted, labored underthe "terrific handicap of coming into ... an office where the threads ofinformation were so multitudinous that only long previous familiarity couldallow him to control them. "More to the point were Truman's own comments:
"They didn't tell me anything about what was going on.... Everybodyaround here that should know anything about foreign affairs is out. "Facedwith burdens sufficiently awesome to intimidate any individual, Truman hadto act quickly on a succession of national security questions, aided onlyby his native intelligence and a no-nonsense attitude reflected in the now -famous slogan that adorned his desk: "The Buck Stops Here."
Truman's dilemma was compounded by the extent to which Roosevelt hadacted "as his own secretary of state, sharing with almost no one his plansfor the postwar period. Roosevelt placed little trust in the State
Department's bureaucracy, disagreed with the suspicion exhibited toward
Russia by most foreign service officers, and for the most part appeared tobelieve that he alone held the secret formula for accommodation with the
Soviets. Ultimately that formula presumed the willingness of the Russianleadership "to give the Government of Poland [and other Eastern Europeancountries] an external appearance of independence [italics added], "in thewords of Roosevelt's aide Admiral William Leahy. In the month before hisdeath, FDR had evidently begun to question that presumption, becomingincreasingly concerned about Soviet behavior. Had he lived, he may wellhave adopted a significantly tougher position toward Stalin than he hadtaken previously. Yet in his last communication with Churchill, Rooseveltwas still urging the British prime minister to "minimize the Soviet problemas much as possible. . . because these problems, in one form or another,seem to arrive everyday and most of them straighten out. "If Stalin'sintentions still remained difficult to fathom so too did Roosevelt's. Andnow Truman was in charge, with neither Roosevelt's experience to informhim, nor a clear sense of Roosevelt's perceptions to of
