East Timor Independence?

Contents.
. Introduction ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... .. 3
. Ethnological origin, demography and policy ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... .... 3
. Before and after the arrival of the Europeans ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... .. 6
. Japanese occupation during World War II ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 7
. The Portuguese colonial empire ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... .. 8
. Indonesian invasion ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... .. 10
. Introduction to Indonesia ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... .... 12
. Independence of Indonesia and Sukarno ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 13
. Formation of East-Timorese political associations ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 17
. The parties ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... .... 18
. Australian support ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... .... 21
. USA admits Timorese right to self-determination ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... .. 23
. Indonesia admits independence ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... .... 23
. Agreement Between the Republic of Indonesia and the Portugese

Republic on the Question of East Timor ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... .. 24
. Conclusion ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 26

Introduction.

It is not easy to write with feigned calm and dispassion about theevents that have been unfolding in East Timor. Horror and shame arecompounded by the fact that the crimes are so familiar and could so easilyhave been halted by the international community a long time ago.

Timor, the Malay word for "Orient", is an island of the Malay
Archipelago, the largest and easternmost of the Lesser Sundas, lyingbetween parallels 8 deg. 17 'and 10 deg. 22 'of south latitude andmeridians 123 deg. 25 'and 127 deg. 19 'of latitude east from Greenwich. Itis bathed by the Indian Ocean (Timor Sea) at South, and Pacific Ocean
(Banda Sea) at North and has an oblong configuration in the direction ofsouthwest - northeast. The island is surrounded by the Roti and Savalislands through the Roti Strait, by the Lomblem, Pantar and Ombai islandsacross the Ombai Strait and by Kissar isle to the northeast. Southwards,
Australia dists about 500 km, and 1000 km separates the southwest point of
Timor from Java.

The total area of Timor is of 32 350 sq km, measuring the maximums of
470 km in length and 110 km in width. About 480 km wide, and a surface of
450 000 sq km, the Timor Sea which is divided between the two territories,opening west into the Indian Ocean and east into the Arafura Sea, part ofthe Pacific Ocean.

The territory of the island - East Timor - of which Portugal wasrecognized administrative power by United Nations, occupies an estimatedarea of almost 19 000 km, and comprises the eastern half of the island,with 265 km in length and 92 km of maximum width and an area of 16 384 kmand the enclave of Ocussi-Ambeno that dists 70 km from Batugadi, with 2 461sq km and a coastline 48 km long. Still part of East Timor is the island of
Ataero (or Pulo-Cambing) with 144 sq km, just 23 km northwards of thecapital Dili and the tiny isle of Jaco with 8 sq km, being the orientalextreme of East Timor just ahead of Tutuala.

Ethnological origin, demography and policy.

There are 12 ethnic groups in East Timor each of which has its ownlanguage: 9 Austronesian language groups - Tetum, Mambai, Tokodede, Kemak,
Galoli, Idate, Waima'a, Naueti; and 3 Papuan language groups - Bunak,
Makasae, Fatuluku. The Tetum live in two separate geographic areas within
East Timor. A simplified version of the Tetum language was utilised in Diliby the Portuguese as a lingua franca. This language has spread throughout
East Timor so that Tetum, in its original or simplified form, came to bespoken by about 60% of the population. Though widespread, it is notunderstood by all.

One of the first references to the natives of East Timor is expressedin the description that in 1514 the Portuguese Rui de Brito sent to king D.
Manuel. In our free transcription, he wrote in these terms: "Timor is anisland beyond Java, has plenty sandalwood, plenty honey, plenty wax, hasn'tjunks for navigating, is a big island of kaffirs. "

The` kaffir 'is meant to refer to the "black and of troubled hair".
Timorese what, not being untrue, was an imprecise observation as the typewas to be found only in some regions, specially in Ocussi, and genericallyin West Timor.

From the antrophological point of view, the island arouses the upmostscientific interest such is the heterogeneity of it's people.

For centuries the East Timorese had been farmers, living in scatteredhamlets and eating what they grew. Only a few coastal East Timorese werefishermen. Trading and shop keeping had for generations been in the handsof the Chinese. East Timor is extremely mountainous, so the majority of
East Timorese had always lived in isolation, far from towns and foreigninfluences, tied to their fields and animistic practices. In spite ofcenturies of Catholic missionary work by the Portuguese, in 1975 animistsstill numbered as much as 72% of the population. The local Timorese kingsstill played an important part in their lives and allegiances, whilstinterference from Portuguese administrators and military was almost non -existent.

In the period between World War 2 and the 1975 Indonesian invasion, anumber of East Timorese managed to gain an education in the colony's fewschools. Some were mestizos, of Timorese and Portuguese parentage, otherswere Timorese from traditional ruling families, but the majority werenative Timorese who gained their education through the Catholic minorseminary. The emergence of this small educated elite in the 1960s and 1970sensured that, when the Portuguese left East Timor in 1975, these peoplewith schooling, and nationalist aspirations, became the territory'sleaders.

Politically, socially and ethnologically Timorese differ amongstthemselves in groups. There is the division in independent sucos
(kingdoms), the distinction between the Atoni tribes of the Serviankingdom, in West Timor, and the Belos of the Portuguese territory, groupssuch as the Firacos, ethnic designation adopted by the Timorese in between
Baucau and Luca, or the Caladi which are the inhabitants of the centralcrest, Malays and non-Malays, so many "sucos" and more than twentylanguages and dialects, the contribution of the exogamy, of partiesirreconcilable. In conclusion, that is the expression of a relative absenceof bio-ethnic unity of the populations.

The history of a People and their Culture voted to banishment fromtheir motherland, the eastern half of an island, former Portuguese colonyis the much unknown. Timor lies in South East Asia enclosed in world'slargest archipelago. That is Indonesia, which gave it's name to the
Republic constituted after the dutch withdrawl. Since the beginning,
Indonesian governments have experienced resistance coming from independistmovements of various islands which claim ethnical and cultural diveristyfrom the predominant Javanese type. Nonetheless they were continuouslysilenced thus unable to internationalize the situation to a stage thatwould force foreign intervention. When it became inevitable, in that singleexception of the western half of New Guinea, the autodetermination of thepapuans in favour of an integration in Indonesia was observed as an
Indonesian orchestrated act, and remembered until today as the darkestepisode in the history of UN.

Indonesia couldn't either afford the regional instability that theprospect of a small nation rising in between the empire would arouse. Thissolitary piece of territory and it's inhabitants had to be sacrificed for ahugger cause.

Portugal which's vast colonial possessions had once made the countrygreat, with times had become responsible for it's retardment. The drawlingof the situation was put to an end with a successful coup d'etat, in April
'74, Which engaged a national revolution ceasing dictatorship and commitedto decolonization. Meanwhile, if East Timor, due to distance and expense,was already the most forgotten colony, less attention it was given towardsthe definition of it's future as the longed changes in the metropolisdidn't avoid internal deviations and contradictions. It brought instabilityto the government of the country and the urgence to lay the basis ofdemocracy.

For Indonesia however, the solution was announced: annexation by anyterms. As it couldn't be done without cover-up, the Indonesian accountedthe "ignorance" of Timor's closest neighbor, Australia, offering access tothe Timor Gap for oil. The maintenance of economic and institutionalrelations was (is) too important. Necessary non-interference fromsuperpower USA was also naturally reached. Having the Americans weakenedtheir position in South East Asia after Vietnam, Indonesia was regarded asthe last great bastion of anti-communism in the region, essentially inthose years for reasons of military strategy as we'll see ahead. Thusfriendly relations were very important to preserve.

So, in name of political, economical and military goals, with twomajor countries making it possible for the pretender of East Timor, andbefore the impotence of Administrative Power Portugal, Indonesia invaded in
December '75, interrupting a process of decolonization in course. Theaction was promptly condemned by the United Nations. Although in face of
International Law, and of the most elementary human rights, Indonesia isregularly criticized by the International Community, East Timor remainsstill insignificant to put at stake superior governmental interests.

As the case of East Timor becomes more of a serious arrow nailed inthe flank of Indonesia's diplomacy, Jakarta multiplies efforts to gainvotes amongst countries who normally vote against in the sessions of UN,the mediator of the discussions between Portugal and Indonesia (without
Timorese representation) to avoid further embarrassments that have resulteduncomfortable for its economic relations, and desirable leading roleamongst the Non-Aligned Movement, the same that combated colonialism.

Nevertheless the same policy persists for Timor. As if once theannexation has been carried out it urges by all means to prove therighteousness of such action.

For the last 19 years, an excess of 200 000 Timorese have been killedby the Indonesians. The Resistance arms itself with the weapons capturedfrom the enemy. Women, the aged and the children are concentrated in campswhere they do forced labour and many starve to death. Suspects aretortured, spanking and sexual abuse are constant, many women have beensterilized. Family members are deliberately aparted. Transmigrationprograms project the definite dissolution of the Maubere People.

Before and after the arrival of the Europeans

Previous to the European interference in the indigenous scheme oflife, the island of Timor was inhabited by barbarian people that couldn'twrite but used iron and was already agricultural. Industry was limited tothe fabrication of cotton cloths with which they covered themselves and thecommerce reduced to the trade of wax and sandalwood for certain productsthat brought to Timor makasare, malays and javanese.

Much before the arrival of Portuguese and Dutch, Timor was part of thecommercial nets politically centered east of Java, after in the Celebes,and linked by trade to China and India. In documents published during the
Ming dynasty, in 1436, the commercial value of Timor is put in relief anddescribed as a place where "the mountains are covered by trees ofsandalwood producing the country nothing else ". One of the first Portugueseto visit the island, Duarte Barbosa, wrote in 1518: "there's an abundanceof sandalwood, white, to which the Muslims in India and Persia give greatvalue and where much of it is used ".

Other products were exported such as honey, wax and slaves, but traderelied mainly on sandalwood.

Japanese occupation during World War II

During the Second World War, Portugal declared a policy of neutrality.
Dutch and Australian troops nonetheless disembarked at East Timor indisrespect of Portuguese sovereignty. But the real menace came with the
Japanese invasion, three months later, in February of 1942. The islandbecame a stage of war between Japanese and the allieds. Timorese were seenas secondary actors when in truth, after crossing a period of rebellionagainst Portuguese rule, were they the more sacrificed during theresistance until 1945.

In spite of Portugal's policy of neutrality, the Australian and Dutchtroops entered in Timor. It was the first of two foreigner militaryinvasions. In Lisbon, Oliveira de Salazar denounced the allied disembark asan invasion of a neutral territory. Shortly after arrived the Japanese.
It's not to admire that J. Santos Carvalho saw in these actions an attitudeof depreciation towards the sovereignty of Portugal. When the allied forcesarrived at Dili in December the 17th of 1941, he says that governor
Ferreira de Carvalho, without means to retaliate by arms ordered thenational flag to be hoisted in all public partitions and buildings of thecolony. To further mark his position of neutrality he confined himself tohis residence and, by free determination, wished to be considered prisoner.

The population of the capital went to live in the interior, mainly in
Aileu, Liquie and Maubara. Some of the few Portuguese that remained in Dilipursued nevertheless with their usual lives, socializing with the forcesstationed in Timor. They were given instructions by the local government tomaintain a correct attitude but to show no familiarity neither tocollaborate. An atmosphere of normality gain form, and some families wereprepared to go back. It is even reported that an agreement signed by
English and Portuguese governments defined that the allied troops wouldretire as soon as arrived a contingent of Portuguese forces from Maputo
(Mozambique).

What happened instead was the Japanese invasion of Dili, in Februaryof 1942. During January they had managed to occupy Malaysia (except
Singapore), the Philippines (but not Bataan), Borneo and the Celebes,
Birmania, New Guinea and the Salmon islands. Following general L. M.
Chassin - "at the end of the second month of an hyperbolic invasion, the
Japanese tide extended itself irresistibly beyond paralyzed and impotentadversaries. "In the middle of February they invaded Sumatra occupying
Palembang, soon after Singapore is attacked and many Englishmen are madeprisoners. Java was surrounded and on the 20th, Bali and Timor were taken.
After a weak resistance, the Dutch troops abandoned by the Javanesesoldiers - which were in majority -, escaped to the interior leavingbehind armament. Dili was then violently sacked by the Japanese, who foundthe city almost uninhabited.

The Portuguese colonial empire

Up to the final years of dictatorship in Portugal, in spite of thecondemnation of UN and the start of the guerrilla warfare in the Africancolonies of Angola, Guinea and Mozambique, the Portuguese Colonial Empirewas defended by the government as an heritage of the glorious past andmotive of national pride. However, the crescent expenses of it'smaintenance begun to reflect increasingly on the economy and social tissueof the metropolis, what provoked crescent discontentment of the population,finally leading to the Revolution of '74 that installed democracy and gaveindependence to the colonies. East Timor was invaded by Indonesia preciselyin the course of decolonization.

During dictatorship, the colonies continued to be dedicatedconsiderable interest. For the nationalist ideology that characterized theregime, the vast regions of the World under Portuguese sovereignty were tobe seen as the justification of a necessary conscience of greatness andpride to be Portuguese.

The expression "Portuguese Colonial Empire" would be generalized andeven met official formalization. Colonial patrimony was considered as theremaining spoils of the Portuguese conquests of the glorious period ofexpansion.

These notions were mystified but also expressed in Law as in 1930
Oliveira de Salazar (at the time minister of Finances and, for some time ofthe Colonies) published the Colonial Act. It stated some fundamentalprinciples for the overseas territorial administration and proclaimed thatit was "of the organic essence of the Portuguese nation to possess andcolonize overseas territories and to civilize indigenous populations therecomprised ". The overseas dimension of Portugal was however soon put atstake after World War II. The converging interest of the two victorioussuperpowers on the re-distribution of World regions productors of rawmaterials contributed for an international agreement on the legal right forall peoples to their own government. Stated as a fundamental principle ofthe UN Charter, anti-colonialism gave thrust to the independist movementsof the colonies, and in matter of time unavoidably accepted by the greatcolonial nations: England, France, Netherlands, Belgium. Yet such countriesrelied on mechanisms of economical domination that would last, assuringthat political independence wouldn't substantially affect the structure oftrade relations.

Loss of the Indian territories and the reactions. The first problemthat the Portuguese had to deal with was the conflict with the Indian
Union, independent state in 1947. The Indian nationalism had triumphed overthe English occupation, and in 1956 forced the French to abandon theirestablishments in 1956. The same was demanded to the Portuguese over theirterritories of Goa, Daman and Diu, but in face of refusal. India severedthe diplomatic relations. The passage through Indian territory in order toreach the two enclaves dependent of Daman was denied since 1954, anddespite the recognition of such right by International Court of Justicerecognized t (1960), Dadrб and Nagar Haveli were effectively lost. This wasfollowed by mass invasions of passive resisters which Portuguese were stillable to hinder until December 19 of 1961, when the Indian Union madeprevail it's superior military force, to obtain final retreat of the
Portuguese.

Goa had been capital of the Portuguese expansion to the East.
Conquered in 1510 by Afonso de Albuquerque, it was also an active center ofreligious diffusion to the point of being called the Rome of the Orient. Inspite of it's the historical and spiritual importance, the reactionsagainst the military attack of the Indian Union parted mainly from officialsectors, and only moderately shared by the public opinion. For thehistorian J. Hermano de Saraiva whom we have followed, it reflected thedominant politic ideologies: at the end of the XIXth century, thecolonizing activity was considered a service rendered to civilization butsince World War II viewed as an attempt to the liberty of the peoples. This
"Doctrinal involucre of interest to which the Portuguese were completelystrange was rapidly adopted by the intellectual groups, in great partresponsible for the formation of the public opinion ". That's how Saraivajustifies that the protests for the loss of Goa to the Indian Union weredirected less to the foreign power than to the Portuguese authorities, "fornot having known to negotiate a modus viviendi acceptable for both parts ".
More than that, he detects in this curious reaction a tendency that wouldaccentuate along the two following decades: the crisis of patriotism. Todefend or to exalt the national values appeared to the bourgeois elites ofthe 60's as a provincial attitude, expression of cultural under -development.

Indonesian invasion

Indonesia invaded the territory in December 1975, relying on USdiplomatic support and arms, used illegally but with secret authorisationfrom Washington; new arms shipments were sent under the cover of anofficial "embargo".

There was no need to threaten bombing or even sanctions. It would havesufficed for the US and its allies to withdraw active participation andinform their associates in the Indonesian military command that theatrocities must be terminated and the territory granted the right of self -determination, as upheld by the United Nations and the international courtof justice. "We cannot undo the past, but should at least be willing torecognise what we have done, and face the moral responsibility of savingthe remnants and providing reparations "- a small gesture of compensationfor terrible crimes.

Many were immediately killed, while their villages were burned down tothe ground. Others run to the mountains in the heart of their land, andorganized a resistance movement. These brave peasants - and their sons --have opposed the barbarian indonesian soldiers for 23 years now. Torture,rape, all kinds of physical, sexual and psychological violations, violentrepression and brutal murder have been the daily life of the Maubere people
(the original people of East Timor) since.

Even before president Habibie's surprise call for a referendum thisyear, the army anticipated threats to its rule, including its control over
East Timor's resources, and undertook careful planning with "the aim, quitesimply ... to destroy a nation ".

The plans were known to western intelligence. The army recruitedthousands of West Timorese and brought in forces from Java. More ominously,the military command sent units of its dreaded US-trained Kopassus specialforces and, as senior military adviser, General Makarim, a US-trainedintelligence specialist with "a reputation for callous violence".

Terror and destruction began early in the year. The army forcesresponsible have been described as "rogue elements" in the west. There isgood reason, however, to accept Bishop Belo's assignment of directresponsibility to General Wiranto. It appears that the militias have beenmanaged by elite units of Kopassus, the "crack special forces unit" thathad "been training regularly with US and Australian forces until theirbehaviour became too much of an embarrassment for their foreign friends ".

These forces adopted the tactics of the US Phoenix programme in the
Vietnam war, which killed tens of thousands of peasants and much of theindigenous South Vietnamese leadership, as well as "the tactics employed bythe Contras "in Nicaragua. The state terrorists were" not simply goingafter the most radical pro-independence people, but ... the moderates, thepeople who have influence in their community. "

Well before the referendum, the commander of the Indonesian militaryin Dili, Colonel Tono Suratman, warned of what was to come: "If the pro -independents do win ... all will be destroyed. It will be worse than 23years ago ". An army document of early May, when international agreement onthe referendum was reached, ordered "massacres should be carried out fromvillage to village after the announcement of the ballot if the pro -independence supporters win ". The independence movement" should beeliminated from its leadership down to its roots ".

Citing diplomatic, church and militia sources, the Australian pressreported that "hundreds of modern assault rifles, grenades and mortars arebeing stockpiled, ready for use if the autonomy option is rejected at theballot box ".

All of this was understood by Indonesia's" foreign friends ", who alsoknew how to bring the terror to an end, but preferred evasive and ambiguousreactions that the Indonesian generals could easily interpret as a "greenlight "to carry out their work.

The sordid history must be viewed against the background of US-
Indonesia relations in the postwar era. The rich resources of thearchipelago, and its critical strategic location, guaranteed it a centralrole in US global planning. These factors lie behind US efforts 40 yearsago to dismantle Indonesia, perceived as too independent and too democratic
- Even permitting participation of the poor peasants. These factors accountfor western support for the regime of killers and torturers who emergedfrom the 1965 coup.

Their achievements were seen as a vindication of Washington's wars in
Indochina, motivated in large part by concerns that the "virus" ofindependent nationalism might "infect" Indonesia, to use Kissinger-likerhetoric.

The recent convulsions inside Indonesia - with its people finallycrying for freedom and democracy - and the Nobel Peace Prize of 1996 --shared between Bishop Belo, a dominican supporting the Maubere people in
Dili, and Jose Ramos Horta, a politician and activist who represents the
Resistance historic leader, Xanana Gusmao, imprisioned in Indonesia for a
20-year sentence - have brought a new hope to the fight of this martyrpeople. Also, economic crisis hitting south-east Asia has shaken thedictatorship in Jakarta more than ever. The winds of change blowingthroughout Indonesia started to hit East Timor ...

Introduction to Indonesia

Indonesia is the country with the more of Muslims in the world whichmeans 87 per cent of 180 million habitants. Nevertheless, the major part ofthe declared Muslims mix their faith in Allah with animistic or Hindu-
Buddhist beliefs. These are reminiscences of the Indian colonization thatwould be interrupted with the penetration of Islam in the 16th century,generally superficial and incomplete.

Due to the insular configuration, composed by 13 677 islands, 3 000inhabited, and with an approximate extension of 1/8 the perimeter of Earth,
Indonesia faces problems of national unity. Being the fifth most populousnation, 2/3 are concentrated in only the fifth larger island, Java, wherethe density is one of the highest. The solution passes inevitably by birthcontrol and transmigration to territories such as Papua New Guinea,recently East Timor but also in between with the evident purpose ofdissolving local cultures in the predominant Javanese which is only oneamongst 360 tribal and ethno-linguistic groups and more than 250 differentlanguages and dialects.

The Dutch colonial domain had been massively based in Java, with therest of the archipelago had developed very unequally. From the rigid
Islamic areas of North Sumatra to the tribes of Borneo or the Christianislands of the east, a variety of economic and social systems experiencedvery distinct problems for their progress.

Independence of Indonesia and Sukarno

At the time of Indonesia's proclamation of independence in 1945,
President Sukarno defined an ideological base for the state - the "Pancasila "(meaning" five virtues ") - to be followed by all citizens and swornby the social organizations. Main principles imposed were the adoption of
Indonesian "Bahasa" language and the acceptance of one among five religions
- Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism and Buddhism - forbiddingthe animist cults and other traditional practices. Thus "Panca sila" wasassumed as an instrument of governmental control and a mean to javanize thediverse cultures.

But not without much internal opposition. Illuded with the possibilityof the creation of an official Islamic state, when Suharto reached topower, Communist administrators and Islamic movements supported the
Revolution, but what they didn't expect was the minor concessions offered,and once annihilated the Communist Party, an "important preoccupation ofthe government has been to control, domesticate or destroy the mostorthodox and active Muslim factions "(Prof. A. Barbedo de Magalhгes, Oporto
University). Since then they oftenly erupt in riots against the militaryaristocracy, basically syncretic in matter of religion.

Besides reaffirming the "Panca sila", in 1982 Suharto introduced the
Law of the Associations which would fasten the strain on political,religious and social associations as it increased the powers of theadministration to dismiss or impute directors to the aggregations, todestroy or agglutinate them in others more vast and controlled by themilitaries.

Social and Political instability is patent in public insurrections infavor of democracy, which in September of 1984 culminated with the killingof 60 Muslims and imprisonment of important personalities such as of formergovernors that defied an inquiry to the incident.

Neo-colonialism in Indonesia? Many authors mention that Sukarno had adream: the formation of a great Indonesia comprising the totality of theancient Dutch East Indies, inclusive the non-Indonesian population. Forthis reason had he renounced to the federate structures initially conceivedfor the creation of the United States of Indonesia - thus betraying theagreement with the Dutch for the transfer of sovereignty -, in favor of anunitary constitution, although still provisional. The new direction wastaken in August of 1950, three months after an unilateral declaration ofindependence by the South Moluccas.

The first elections, free and democratic in fact, would be held in
1955, but disputed by more or less 170 parties! Their differences naturallybrought difficulties to the functioning of the parliamentary democracy. Onone hand, between the exponents of pre-Islamic syncretism of the "Nahdatul
Ulama "(NU) and the orthodox Moslems of the" Masyumi ", which's vitalstrength came from the outside - West Sumatra and North Celebes besides
Occidental Java (Sundanese ethnic origin). On the other hand, between the
Nationalist Party (PNI) and the Communist Party (PKI), based in Java, andthese with the Moslems.

The inefficiency of the administration, which passed through sevengovernments since 1949 to '57, and the rivalry engaged by the partiesalone, in contrast with the heroism of the Revolution of August 17th, afterall, the concentration of decision and power in Java as restrictor of theeconomic, social and cultural development aroused at the end tension in theexterior islands.

In February of 1957, Sukarno criticized the Western liberal democracybecause unadapted to Indonesian particularity. He interfered more in theconstitutional processes and appeals to his concept of "Guided Democracy",founded on indigenous procedures: the important questions should be decidedthrough prolonged deliberations ( "musyawarah") in order to obtain consensus
( "mukafat"). This was the practice in the village and the same model oughtto be adopted for the nation. Sukarno proposed a government formed by thefour main parties and a national council represented by parties andfunctional groups in which, under the guidance of the president (himself),consensus would express itself.

In spite of the charisma gained by Sukarno as father of the countryand mentor of the principle "unity in diversity", he was unable to avoidthe proclamations of the martial law in March of 1957 as a response to theregional dissidences which reached their peak.

At the end of the year a further set-back was brought by the defeat ofa motion for the renewal of negotiations concerning the destiny of West New
Guinea. In a series of direct actions across the country, Dutch propertywas seized with the Indonesian government taking over. In the beginning of
1958 West Sumatra claimed for the constitution of a new central governmentunder the leadership of Hatta, a moderate and historic figure of the
Revolution, from the start vice-president of Sukarno up until two years agowhen he resigned because disagreeing with his policy. Ignored the appeal ofthe Sumatrese a new revolutionary government was formed, supported byleaders of the Masyumi Party, including the ex-Prime Ministers Natsir
(September 1950 - March '51) and Harahap (August '55 - March '56). Themilitary commandant of the North Celebes joined the initiative, yet moststriking was CIA's assistance with armament including aircrafts.

Suppression of the revolt was nevertheless soon accomplished, and withthe regions undermined, the parties discredited and the prestige of thevictorious army elevated, Sukarno resumed the idea of Guided Democracy inpartnership with the military. Meanwhile, the army chief of staff A.
Nasution had committed himself to the thought that the return to therevolutionary constitution of 1945 (presidential-type) would offer the bestmeans for implementing the principles of deliberation, consensus andfunctional representation. Sukarno urged this course in a speech to the
Constituent Assembly, elected in 1955 to draft a permanent constitution.
Despite failing the approval of the necessary two-thirds for majority, heintroduced it through a presidential decree of dubious legality.

Indonesia's domestic as well as foreign diplomacy is difficult toconceive in terms other than in the context of neo-colonialism. Itcertainly is incompatible with the spirit of the Afro-Asian Conference of
Bandung held in Java, in 1955. Among twenty nine countries consensus wasreached in order to condemn colonialism "in all it's forms ofmanifestation ". As it seems, imperialism isn't condemnable so long theterritories comes from an ancient colony. Like the annexation of the
Moluccan islands (1950-52) and in 1969 the also former Dutch West New
Guinea, long pretended. The last was integrated after an Act of Free Choicesanctioned by UN. In truth, many journalists and observers would considerthe process orchestrated but it had already been sealed. Today it isremembered as perhaps the most unfortunate episode UN's history.

In both regions, as well as in other islands of the Pacific,population claim Melanesian ancestrality, not identifying themselves with
Indonesia, predominantly Malaysian.

The country has always been tormented by regional rebellions. From theperpetrated by Islamic fundamentalist movements, even in Java (where in thedistrict of Acheh, a Moslem state practically subsisted between 1948 and
1962), Sumatra and Celebes as we've seen but also Kalimantan, to thoseinvolving Christian groups as in the South Moluccas. Still in 1984 the
Movement for the Liberation of Papua erupted in attacks against the maincities of the territory, hoisting their flag in the capital opposite to the
Regional Parliament.

The power of Sukarno depended along the years of the preservation ofthe equilibrium between the army and the Communist Party (PKI). The periodassisted to the crescent popularity of the communists due to the consistentprotection moved by the President in face of the incursions of themilitaries. he opposed to the prohibitions of congresses and editorials,banished political organizations patronized by the military to blacken the
PKI, placing some of their militants in political posts. Many analyststhink that Sukarno was preparing the path for the rise of the communists tothe power. Others say that his action intended to assure a the permanentlythreatened equilibrium

The coup of Suharto and the military. On the night of September 30,
1965, a group of subaltern officials based at Halim Air Base attempted acoup d'йtat to anticipate what they alleged to be the take-over of a pro-
Western council of generals. But by following morning the Strategic Reserveof the Army Forces (KOSTRAD), commanded by Suharto, had concluded asuccessful counter-attack. For specialist Benedict Anderson, of Cornell
University, it seems odd that Suharto, who would gather the reins of powerinto his hands, hadn't been aimed at by the "30th of September Movement"which assassinated six army generals (while a seventh, A. Nasution,escaped).

With propaganda that implicated important nationalist and communistpoliticians in the first stroke and the estimulation of the widely spreadresentment of the pro-Chinese PKI was object of among the Indonesian
Islamic groups, the militaries gradually assumed power. Suharto begun tomaintain the already wasted and sickened Sukarno in a fictional presidency,as a symbol of national unity until by decree emptying his legal authority,in March 11, 1966. The next semester would be fatal for more than half amillion Chinese and Indonesian besides an excess of 200 thousand politicalprisoners which altogether formed one of the greatest Communist parties ofthe World. The wave of hysteria was such that they were pointed out andoftenly even executed by their proper neighbor civilians in the villages.

Formation of East-Timorese political associations

During Portuguese dictatorship, civilians were prohibited to gatherfor political discussions. But since the 60's an educated elite withnationalist aspirations begun to reune clandistinely and vehicle someprinciples in catholic press. Three weeks after the democratic Revolution,formation of political associations was incentivated, in the process ofdecolonization. Immediatly UDT was founded, wanting to prolong Portugal'spresence in view of a progressive autonomy. ASDT, future Fretilin, calledfor radical independence, while Apodeti, supported by Indonesia, for theintegration of East Timor in the neighbour power.

Although the changes acrossing the metropolis were of little immediateeffect in the rural society, they had profound impact among the elites of
East Timor, particularly in the administrator sectors, centered in thecities and specially in Dili They polarized the opposition to certainemerge, often product of the catholic schools and particularly from theseminaries of Dare (outside Dili) and S. Jose in the colony of Macao.
Discussions involved small groups of students and administrators thatgathered clandestinely in the capital. The main escapes of their ideas werecatholic publications of reduced circulation like Seara, which was closeddown by the political police PIDE.

The conclusions reached are considered general and vagrant. Subjectslike traditional marriage and the educational system were debated but notmuch was proposed as a global critic and alternatives.

Anyhow, this collective of student-administrators and higher levelbureaucrats, as well as important rural proprietors would constitute thebasis of the two main political parties: UDT and ASDT/Fretilin.

Three weeks after the Revolution 25th of April, the Governor of East
Timor created the Commission for the Autodetermination which's intentionswere to bring out to legality all the incipient political associations.

The parties

UDT (Timor Democratic Union). This became the first party, was alsothe most popular for some months. The initial declaration, of May 11th,made apology of democratic principles, distribution of revenues and, thefulcral aspect, a progressive autonomy materialized with an increasingparticipation of the Timorese but always in the light of the Portugueseflag, to culminate with the integration of East Timor in a Portugueselanguage community. The political platform as conceived by first president
Mбrio Carrascalгo was to hold Portugal's presence as far as possiblewithout putting aside the option for independence. But although havingpresented a cohesive front at start, the course of events in the monthsfollowed would evidence different susceptibilities towards a same problem.

Firmly based on two groups, the higher positioned administrator eliteand the larger proprietors of coffee plantations. UDT accounted still thefavours of many suco liurais, although the majority of these belonged tothe circle of the imposed chiefs, in an ancient practice of the colonialgovernment to substitute the legitimate when less malleable ... They usedtheir influence to gain support for the party in the countryside managingstrong implantation in areas like Liquie, Maubara, Maubisse, Ainaro,
Manatuto, Laclubar.

While a group of conservatives were granted support by traditionalchiefs and administrators - whose positions and privileges under
Portuguese rule made them emphasize a continuation with the metropolis -,those with commercial preoccupations of economical diversification beyondthe Portuguese orbit focused on the advantages of independence.

Not until 27 of July did the MFA in Lisbon determine the neworientation in relation with the colonial territories. By it, the Timoresewere officially and for the first time confronted with the possibility ofindependence.

In a message to the Portuguese President, UDT still inquired about theviability of federation, but no further elucidation was obtained. Few dayslater, UDT published the provisional statutes where preconizedautodetermination oriented to federation with Portugal, with anintermediate phase for obtention of independence, and rejecting integrationin any potential foreign country. It is probable that the discouragement ofa definite bind with Portugal had also to do with the winds of independencethat blew from the ancient metropolis. Spreading throughout the Africancolonies, in East Timor it influenced a crescent opposing party ofindependist militancy that defied UDT's hesitations: ASDT.

Amongst UDT founders pontificated the mentioned Mario Carrascalгo,proprietor of coffee plantations, director of the Agriculture Services, andalso former leader of caetanist party ANP (Popular National Association),the only one allowed. Ex-seminarist Lopes da Cruz was too a ANP member anddirector of Timor's journal, A Voz de Timor, patronized by the government.
He and intellectual Domingos de Oliveira were custom officials. Cesar
Mouzinho was Mayor of Dili.

ASDT/Fretilin (Revolutionary Front of Independent East Timor). Theplan of ASDT was acknowledged in the proper day of it's foundation, 20th of
May. Adopting the doctrines of socialism and democracy it called upfrontfor a gradual independence preceded of administrator, economical, socialand political reforms. Three to eight years was the period of transitionconsidered necessary. And from the beginning with the participation of the
Timorese in the administration.

In the majority, ASDT was constituted with recent recruited members ofthe urbane elites, mainly those living in Dнli, which maintained the linkto the rural areas of where they came from. Some were even descendants ofliurai families.

With an average age under 30, the elder Xavier do Amaral, of 37,became ASDT's chairman. The leaders were commited to nationalism andreaffirmation of the Timorese culture, agreed on the priority ofagricultural development, on alphabetization and extensive healthprogrammes. But furthermore, the political perspectives deferred. Thedominating tendency between the founders of ASDT was clearly social -democratic, represented by men like journalist Ramos-Horta, administrator
Alarico Fernandes, Justino Mota and former professor Xavier do Amaral.
Ramos-Horta says that for him and the majority of his colleagues itrepresented social justice, equitative distribution of the country'swealth, a mixed economy and a parliamentary system with extended democraticliberties. As to what extent did they have a model, sociologist John G.
Taylor mentions the social-democracy of the 60 and 70's in Austria and
Scandinavia. Anyway it wasn't experimented, as the urgency to gain internaland foreign support seems to have kept on depriving the opportunity.

Still during the ASDT period, a secondary current leaded by ancientsergeant and administrator, also ex-seminarist, Nicolau Lobato, "combined afervent anticolonial nationalism with notions of economical and politicaldevelopment self-reliance based upon the experiences of Angola and
Mozambique ". His ideas would begin to prevail after the transformation of
ASDT into FRETILIN.

Apodeti (Timorese Popular Democratic Association). In 25 of May athird party appeared under the designation of Association for the
Integration of Timor in Indonesia. Renamed Apodeti, the manifesto of theparty defended an integration with autonomy in the Republic of Indonesia inaccordance to the International Law and principles such as the obligatoryteaching of the Indonesian language (Indonesian Bahasa), free education andmedical assistance, and the right to go on strike.

The visionaries of Apodeti parted from the assumption that Portugalwould abandon East Timor and that the idea of independence couldn't stand achance because of Indonesia. In reality, the revindication of autonomy in aprocess of integration appeared more as a popular measure and than as apolitical stand.

It has been written that in the beginning of the 60's, BAKIN (militaryco-ordinator agency of the secret intelligence INTEL), mounted a net in
East Timor which dealed with merchants, custom-house functionaries andagents from the Indonesian consulate of Dili, in change of favours,payments and refuge in case of conflict. Among them, those who would becomethe prominent leaders of Apodeti: professor and administrator Osуrio
Soares, liurai of Atsabe (near the boarder of Indonesian Timor) Guilherme
Gonzalves, and cattle breeder Arnaldo dos Reis Arajo.

Still before the Portuguese Revolution, BAKIN had trained East -timoreses in radio transmissions and as interpreters.

Nevertheless, while UDT and ASDT/Fretilin rapidly reached to thethousands of adepts, Apodeti wouldn't reach more than a couple of hundredsduring the whole year of '74.

The support came mainly from the sucos of Guilherme Atsabe and a small
Muslim community of Dili. Besides this it had no expression. The dubiouspersonalities of it's leaders, all with criminal record and their politicalpurposes made Apodeti in the words of East Timor's last governor, J. Lemos
Pires "an enclosed organization, with difficulties to dialogue with thepeople and government even worse with the opponent parties ". Fretilinconsidered Apodeti illegal.

Three minor parties appeared, all more or less insignificant. The KOTA
(Klibur Oan Timur Aswain), meaning "sons of the mountain warriors", wasfiliated in the Popular Monarchical Party of the metropolis. Remountingit's origins to the Topasses (see Ethnology of the Timorese), KOTApostulated the restoration of powers to the liurais who could trace theirancestrality back to the Topasse period in order to constitute a democraticmonarchy, with the king to be elected amongst the liurais. Like KOTA, the
Timorese Democratic Labour Movement hadn't a programme and agrouped onlyeight members, all from the same family. They wished to mobilize theworking class. The Democratic Association for the integration of East Timorin Australia received money for promises of integration in Australia. It'sexistence was ephemerous because the Australian government departed fromthe idea even before the end of 1974.

Of these parties, KOTA and the Labour party were further mentioned andprecisely by the Indonesian authorities with the sole purpose to evoke thatfour of the five parties, which they alleged that was the majority of the
East-timorese, had petitioned for integration during the Civil War

On 15 September the United Nations Security Council unanimouslyauthorised the establishment of a multinational force in Timor (UNSCR
1264). The resolution gives the force three tasks for its mandate: first,to restore peace and security to East Timor; second to protect and supportthe United Nations Mission in East Timor and; third, to facilitate withinforce capabilities humanitarian assistance operations in East Timor. Themultinational force is commanded by Australia's Major General Peter
Cosgrove

Australian support

The multinational force has been authorised by the United Nations
Security Council, under chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, to useall necessary measures to achieve its mandate. The multinational forcewould prepare the ground for the United Nations to complete its task ofmanaging East Timor's transition to independence. This will involve thearrival as soon as possible of a fully-fledged blue helmet UN peacekeepingoperation and the establishment of a UN transitional administration.

Australian support for peacekeeping operations is not something new -
Bougainville is but one ongoing example. But the East Timor operation --multilateral in scope, strongly representing South East Asia, led by
Australia and conducted under a United Nations Chapter VII or peaceenforcement mandate - is of a very different nature. This is the first timethat Australia has been asked by the United Nations to build and lead amultinational force and to provide the largest single component. When
Australia's deployment was at full strength, it had committed 4,500 troops.

Australian involvement in the East Timor crisis is not motivated byany desire to cause difficulties in relations between Australia and
Indonesia. It is important that Australia is in East Timor at the requestof the United Nations and with the agreement of the Indonesian Government.
It was in Australia's vital interests that Indonesia be a peaceful, stableand democratic state, economically prosperous and playing a leading andrespected role in the region. It was also in Indonesia's own interests toensure East Timor's transition is a peaceful and orderly one. Australia'sefforts in building the relations with Indonesia were directed to thatoutcome.

With respect to defence relations, it is in australian securityinterests to have links such as defence attache representation, high-levelstrategic talks, staff college courses, maritime surveillance and disasterrelief exercises. Such contacts are necessary to achieve the objectives in
East Timor, and are desirable because defence links will be part of anyeffective long-term relationship with Indonesia. That decision shows thechallenges Jakarta and Canberra face in maintaining a working defencerelationship that supports the long-term national and strategic interestsof both countries.

Prime Minister Howard has said that "the deployment of Australiantroops to East Timor meets the test of national interest in two respects.
First, in the spirit of Australia's military tradition, troops are going todefend what Australian society believes to be right. The troops are notgoing to occupy territory, to impose the will of Australia on others or toact against the legitimate interests of another country. Rather, they go to
East Timor at the request of the United Nations and with the agreement ofthe Indonesian government. INTERFET troops are defending East Timor'sdesire for independence, as delivered in a free vote granted to them by the
Indonesian Government and with the blessing of the international community.
In addition, INTERFET troops will facilitate the humanitarian relief thatis so desperately needed for the hundreds of thousands of displaced peoplein East Timor.

Second, Australian troops in East Timor will work to put an end to theterrible violence that prevailed immediately after the result of the ballotwas announced. Apart from the human cost, the scale of violence wewitnessed undermines Australia's own interest in a stable region. Thetroops will prepare the way for the United Nations to undertake the vitaltask of developing a transitional political and administrative frameworkfor East Timor. For East Timorese, this offers the hope of reconciliationamong groups that have fought each other for decades and the opportunity tocreate their own future. They have a responsibility to come to grips withthese issues. For Indonesia, it will more readily be able to concentrate onits nation building task, with the full support of the internationalcommunity. "

USA admits Timorese right to self-determination

On a letter to Senator Russel Feingold, dated December 27th, 1996,
U.S. President Bill Clinton recognized, for the first time, that he "notedwith interest your [a group of 15 U.S. Senators] support of a UN-sponsoredself-determination referendum in East Timor ".

Indonesia admits independence

For the first time in 23 years, Indonesia has admitted the right ofthe Timorese people to indepence. Last January, on the eve of another high -level bilateral summit on East Timor between the Portuguese and Indonesian
Foreign Ministers, at the United Nations 'headquarters in New Yourk, the
Indonesian authorities stated that if the East Timorese rejected thecurrent authonomy plan offered by Indonesia, the central government in
Jakarta would be ready to let them separate from their invadors.

Only a couple of weeks later, president BJ Habibie announced, at ameeting with indonesian businessmen at the Chamber of Commerce, that by
January 1st, 2000 the problem of East Timor would be 'fixed': either the
Timorese accepted the "large-scale authonomy" proposed by the Indonesiangovernment in New York (August 5th, 1998), or Indonesia "would wave themgoodbye ". It was the first time the Indonesian authorities openly talked ofindependence for East Timor.

Meanwhile, the situation on the territory has worsened in the lastmonths, followin the alleged massacre at Alas (south of Dili) last
December, when as much as 52 people would have been killed. The military
(18,000 soldiers currently serve in the occupied territory, according tointelligence data smuggled out of East Timor by a dicident officer - thatis, 1 for each 40 East Timorese, or proportionally 7 times more than in therest of Indonesia) have been arming civilian militia, in what internationalobservers consider to be a move aimed at starting a civil war on the vergeof Indonesia's leave.

Agreement Between the Republic of Indonesia and the Portugese Republic on the Question of East Timor

The Governments of Indonesia and Portugal, recalling General Assemblyresolutions and the relevant resolutions and decisions adopted by the
Security Council and the General Assembly on the question of East Timor;bearing in mind the sustained efforts of the Governments of Indonesia and
Portugal since July 1983, through the good offices of the Secretary-
General, to find a just, comprehensive and internationally acceptablesolution to the question of East Timor; recalling the agreement of 5 August
1998 to undertake, under the auspices of the Secretary-General,negotiations on a special status based on a wide-ranging autonomy for East
Timor without prejudice to the positions of principle of the respective
Governments on the final status of East Timor; having discussed aconstitutional framework for an autonomy for East Timor on the basis of adraft presented by the United Nations, as amended by the Indonesian
Government; noting the position of the Government of Indonesia that theproposed special autonomy should be implemented only as an end solution tothe question of East Timor with full recognition of Indonesian sovereigntyover East Timor; noting the position of the Government of Portugal that anautonomy regime should be transitional, not requiring recognition of
Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor or the removal of East Timor fromthe list of Non-Self-Governing Territories of the General Assembly, pendinga final decision on the status of East Timor by the East Timorese peoplethrough an act of self-determination under United Notions auspices; takinginto account that although the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal eachhave their positions of principle on the prepared proposal for specialautonomy, both agree that it is essential to move the peace processforward, and that therefore, the Governments of Indonesia and Portugalagree that the Secretary-General should consult the East Timorese people onthe constitutional framework for autonomy attached hereto as an annex;bearing in mind that the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal requestedthe Secretary-General to devise the method and procedures for the popularconsultation through a direct, secret and universal ballot signed up in New
York on this 5th day of May, 1999 the Agreement Between the Republic of
constitutional framework providing for a special autonomy for East Timorwithin the unitary Republic of Indonesia to the East Timorese people, bothinside and outside East Timor, for their consideration and acceptance orrejection through a popular consultation on the basis of a direct, secretand universal ballot.

Article 2 Request the Secretary-General to establish, immediately after thesigning of this Agreement, an appropriate United Nations mission in East
Timor to enable him to effectively carry out the popular consultation.

Article 3 The Government of Indonesia will be responsible for maintainingpeace and security in East Timor in order to ensure that the popularconsultation is carried out in a fair and peaceful way in an atmospherefree of intimidation, violence or interference from any side.

Article 4 Request the Secretary-General to report the result of the popularconsultation to the Security Council and the General Assembly, as well asto inform the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal and the East Timoresepeople.

Article 5 If the Secretary-General determines, on the basis of the resultof the popular consultation and in accordance with this Agreement, that,the proposed constitutional framework for special autonomy is acceptable tothe East Timorese people, the Government of Indonesia shall initiate theconstitutional measures necessary for the implementation of theconstitutional framework, and the Government of Portugal shall initiatewithin the United Nations the procedures necessary for the removal of East
Timor from the list of Non-Self-Governing Territories of the General
Assembly and the deletion of the question of East Timor from the agendas ofthe Security Council and the General Assembly.

Article 6 If the Secretary-General determines, on the basis of the resultof the popular consultation and in accordance with this Agreement, that theproposed constitutional framework for special autonomy is not acceptable tothe East Timorese people, the Government of Indonesia shall take theconstitutional steps necessary to terminate its links with East Timor thusrestoring under Indonesian law the status East Timor held prior to 17 July
1976, and the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal and the Secretary-
General shall agree on arrangements for a peaceful and orderly transfer ofauthority in East Timor to the United Nations. The Secretary-General shall,subject to the appropriate legislative mandate,initiate the procedureenabling East Timor to begin a process of transition towards independence.

Article 7 During the interim period between the conclusion of the popularconsultation and the start of the implementation of either option, theparties request the Secretary-General to maintain an adequate United
Nations presence in East Timor. "

Conclusion

On August, 30th, History was written in East Timor: 98.6% ofregistered voters exercised their democratic right in a UN-organisedreferendum, considered by the Indonesian authorities as "free and fair".
Defying eight months of intimidation by indonesian-armed militiamen, mostlytransmigrated from West Timor, the population stood in long queues at theballot sites, in some cases waiting hours in the sun after walkingkilometres to the nearest polling station.

Hardly anybody partied in Dili, though, or in the rest of theterritory; celebrations were held abroad, though, in Australia, Portugal,the United States, Ireland, England, Mozambique, even Indonesia, wherever a
Timorese community is to be found. But inside the new Nation, just fourhours after the official announcement, the defeated militia gangs startedto set East Timor on fire. BBC, CNN, and other international TV stationsbroadcasted to the world images once seen in other war scenarios - fire ofautomatic weapons, houses set on fire, innocent civilians seeking shelterin the schools, the churches, the neighbouring mountains. Internationalmedia reports mentioned 145 deaths in Dili only, in the 48 hours followingthe announcement. On September, 5th and 6th, most international observers,journalists and the civilian personnel of UNAMET were evacuated from theterritory, either by chartered planes or the Australian Air Force. On theafternoon of September, the 5th, four indonesian ministers - including
Defence and Foreign Affairs holders, General Wiranto and Mr. Ali Alatas --and one secretary of State paid a 4-hour visit to Dili - though they neverleft the airport "for security reasons".

On the evening of that same day, the UN Security Council, gathered onan emergency meeting in New York, once more abstained from sending in apeace-keeping force. The Indonesian authorities claimed to be able torestore peace and tranquility, though 20.000 men already stationed in theterritory failed to do so until now, and were even reported to haveparticipated, in some cases directly, in the new mass killings started on
September, 4th. TV, photographic and oral evidence from UNAMET staff andinternational media wasn't enough, so the Council decided to send a "fact -finding mission "to Jakarta.

On the morning of September, the 6th, the home of Nobel Peace Prizewinner, Ximenes Belo, was set on fire. The bishop seaked refugee in Baucau,though he was impotent to save the hundreds of refugees in his frontyard,now facing death or deportation to West Timor, like so many before them.
More than 1,000 refugees were sheltered at the UNAMET compound in Dili, andthe UN convoys were shot at in the road to the airport.

Despite several United Nations Resolutions on the right of the
Timorese to self-determination (the UN has never recognized the indonesianannexation of the territory), the international community has been blind tothe fight of its inhabitants. Only since November 12th, 1991, when morethan 250 youngsters were killed during a brutal massacre occurred in acematery in Dili (the capital city of East Timor), have the "civilized"nations condemned Indonesia in a more consistent way. But words ofcondemnation sound empty when the same countries sell arms to the regime (adictatorship ruling Indonesia for decades), and strengthen the economicties binding European and American states to Jakarta.

The five days which mediated until official results were announcedwere days of tension, with frequent militia attacks in Dili and other spotsin the territory. But on the morning of September, 4th, UNAMET (United
Nations Assistance Mission to East Timor) leader Ian Martin announced theresults, minutes after the United Nations 'Secretary-General, Kofi Annan,had done the same in New York: 21.5% of the voters had chosen to accept the
Special Autonomy offered to the territory by Indonesia, while anoverwhelming majority of 78.5% reffused it, thus laying the path toindependence.

The sources

. Aditjondro, George J In The Shadow of Mount Ramelau: The Impact of the

Occupation of East Timor, The Netherlands, 1994

. Aubrey, Jim Free East Timor - Australia's Culpability in East Timor's

Genocide. Vintage - Random House Australia

. Carey, P & GC Bentley East Timor at the Crossroads, The Forging of a

Nation, Cassell, NY, 1995

. CIIR/IPJET International Law and the Question of East Timor, London, 1995

. Cox, Steve Generations of Resistance: East Timor, Cassell, UK, 1995

. Dunn, James 1. East Timor - the Balibo Incident in Perspective, Sydney,

1995

. Timor: A People Betrayed, ABC Books, Sydney, 1996

. East Timor: No Solutions Without respect for Human Rights: Bi-Annual

Report of Human Rights Violations, January to June 1998

. Violence by the State Against Women in East Timor: A Report to the UN

Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Including its Clauses and <